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ABSTRACT 
Yemen is a weak state, as the government does not have the capability to assert effective 
control over the entirety of its territory.  The Yemeni government faces three major 
challenges today including: the Houthi Rebellion, secessionists, and growing political 
unrest due to its failing economy and inability to provide basic social services to its 
people.  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has recently made a resurgence in 
Yemen since its near destruction in 2003.  Yemen’s weak state characteristics, along with 
the failure of jihad in Saudi Arabia, and the lack of Yemeni political will to combat the 
threat of AQAP and their global jihadist agenda have made the state an ideal location for 
the regional organization.  AQAP has been able to exploit Yemen’s weaknesses and build 
strong ties with the Yemeni tribes in the areas of Yemen where the government has little 
control.  The study argues that due to these circumstances, Yemen has the strong 
possibility of becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorism akin to al-Qaeda’s base 
in Pakistan today.  To prevent al-Qaeda from using Yemen as their next base for 
transnational terrorism, the international community must help Yemen address the factors 
that have allowed AQAP to exploit the country. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Al-Qaeda is a transnational network that has conducted operations throughout the 
world since its founding in Afghanistan in 1988, and has mainly operated from three 
states known for weak central authority: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan.  Weak states 
pose many of the same problems as failed states because “poverty, weak institutions, and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks.”1  Today, Yemen fits 
the definition of a weak state, as the government does not have the capability to assert 
effective control over the entirety of its territory nor the ability to provide basic social 
services to all its people.2  The Yemeni government faces many challenges today 
including: the Houthi Rebellion in the North, secessionists in the South, and growing 
political unrest due to its failing economy and inability to provide basic social services.  
Because of the challenges the Yemeni government faces, they are less able to combat al-
Qaeda, which has had a presence in Yemen for over a decade.   
Al-Qaeda has recently made a resurgence in Yemen since its near destruction in 
the country in 2003.  The revitalization of the organization in Yemen should be cause for 
concern for both the Yemeni government as well as the United States, but Al-Qaeda 
seems to have fallen low on the priority list of both countries.  After “Yemen achieved 
success in utilizing U.S. support to dismantle the leadership of al-Qa’ida in Yemen,” the 
Yemeni government and the United States turned their focus elsewhere.3  U.S. focus 
went to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Yemeni focus turned to the Houthi 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of 
Terror (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 26. 
2  There is no universal definition for weak and failed states, but for the purpose of this study I will 
define a weak state as a state that is limited in its ability to effectively control the whole of its territory and 
is limited in its ability to provide basic social and political goods to its people.  A failed state has no control 
over its territory or borders and lacks the political authority and ability to impose the rule of law.  It can no 
longer produce the conditions for its own existence.  
3 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Securing Yemen’s Cooperation in the Second Phase of the War on al-Qa’ida,” 
Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1, no. 1 (November 2007), 14.   
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rebellion in northern Yemen, among other domestic challenges.  After the dismantling of 
their leadership from 2002–2003, the al-Qaeda organization remained splintered until the 
February 2006 prison break of 23 al-Qaeda militants that rejuvenated the organization.  In 
less than four years, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen has transformed itself from a 
fractured and fragmented group into an organization that is intent on and capable of 
launching attacks throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the West.4 
In early 2009, the head of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Nasser al-Wahayshi, announced a 
merger between his organization and al-Qaeda’s Saudi branch to form al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  The establishment of AQAP caused the U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence to note that Yemen was “re-emerging as a jihadist battleground and 
potential regional base of operation for al-Qaeda.”5  The reemergence of AQAP in 
Yemen should cause alarm for both the Yemeni government and the United States with 
respect to their fight to eliminate al-Qaeda as a legitimate organization.  This study 
explores the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (APAP) in Yemen.  It investigates 
the origins of the AQAP, its grievances and ideology, linkages to transnational jihadists, 
and current role as the leading al-Qaeda affiliate organization in the region.  Central to 
this inquiry is the study of Yemen’s limitations in countering AQAP due to the 
challenges the government currently faces. It concludes by exploring the implications of 
AQAP’s resurgence for the war against al-Qaeda. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Yemen seems to be a breeding ground for terrorism; as of November 2008, “more 
than one-third of the remaining 255 detainees at the U.S. detention facility in 
Guantanamo Bay are Yemenis, representing the single largest national contingent.”6  Al-
Qaeda has been able to conduct prominent attacks against western interests in the Yemeni 
area and, as recently as 25 December 2010, has attempted to attack the United States.  If 
                                                 
4 Gregory D. Johnsen, “The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” Combating 
Terrorism Center Sentinel 2, no. 9 (September 2009), 8.   
5 Andre Lee Butters, “The Next Afghanistan?” Time International 174, no. 13, 05 October 2009, 32. 
6 Gregory Johnsen and Christopher Boucek, “The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1, no. 12 (November 2008): 1. 
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the Republic of Yemen (ROY) is not able to counter AQAP, and the nation continues to 
weaken due to the major internal challenges that it faces, Yemen has a very good chance 
of becoming the next major operational center for al-Qaeda.  The message al-Qaeda 
disseminates is resonating with a portion of the Yemeni population, and they are able to 
garner support in the tribal areas of Yemen.  Al-Qaeda’s goals and strategy in Yemen are 
important because if Yemen continues to weaken, the Yemeni government will not have 
the resources to combat AQAP.   
The importance of the status of al-Qaeda in Yemen is also important to the United 
States campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda as a viable terrorist organization.  After the Soviet 
War in Afghanistan ended in 1989, Afghan-Arabs headed by Osama bin Laden, left 
Afghanistan.  During al-Qaeda’s formative years, they operated out of Sudan until they 
were forced to leave in 1996 when they sought refuge in Afghanistan once again, upon 
invitation by the Taliban.  The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 has put al-
Qaeda on the run again as they seek refuge in the ungoverned areas between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  The United States has eliminated Afghanistan as a location where al-Qaeda 
can operate freely, limited its ability to train and recruit, and has also depleted its 
manpower, as many al-Qaeda members have been killed or captured.  Yemen plays an 
important role in the fight against al-Qaeda because if the United States is successful in 
removing al-Qaeda completely from Pakistan and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda may look to the 
weakening state of Yemen as a location where it can regroup, train, and conduct 
operations.  The United States may need to adjust its current policy with Yemen to 
combat a possible revival of al-Qaeda in Yemen.  The importance of the research 
question is that it studies the role of al-Qaeda in a weak state and the effect it may have 
on the national interests and security of the United States. 
C. ISSUES RAISED BY RESEARCH QUESTION 
The three most important issues raised by the research question are: (1) What is 
the likelihood of al-Qaeda establishing a viable regional presence in the Persian Gulf 
through its activities and networks in Yemen? (2) Can the relatively weak state of Yemen 
combat al-Qaeda on its own and does it have the political will to do so, or does it require 
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the assistance of regional and international powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United 
States respectively? and (3) What are the resources and forms of assistance necessary for 
helping Yemen combat the scourge of al-Qaeda terrorism?  The first issue when studying 
the role of al-Qaeda within Yemen is very important, especially if the United States is 
successful in eliminating the presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  If the 
Yemeni government is unable or unwilling to counter the rising threat of AQAP in 
Yemen, the al-Qaeda organization may look to the nation as a possible headquarters to 
operate from if the United States is able to expel them from their current location.  
Yemen could be seen as a favorable selection for al-Qaeda as “about two-thirds of the 
country is out of government control and in the hands of either separatist groups or local 
tribes.”7  The government’s weakness in its inability to control the whole of its territory 
would make it easier for the organization to recruit, train, and operate.   
A second major issue is a question of resources and will.  The Yemeni 
government has been entrenched in a fight against the Houthi Rebellion in the northern 
part of its country, against Yemenis who have called for secession in the south, and 
against political unrest due to its failing economy and inability to provide basic social 
services.  The two conflicts have taken vast amounts of resources from the government, 
and hindered its ability to fix other problems in the country that have caused political 
unrest.  Whereas AQAP has mainly struck at Western targets, the Houthis and southern 
secessionists are striking against the government, causing them to rise to the top of the 
Yemeni government’s priority list.  With the early success of the Yemeni government 
against al-Qaeda in Yemen from 2002 to 2003, the Yemeni government sees al-Qaeda as 
less of a threat and, therefore, has focused on combating the two conflicts at the expense 
of combating AQAP.   
The third issue raised by studying the role of the AQAP in Yemen is to what 
extent the United States must help the Yemeni government due to its inability to combat 
AQAP by itself.  According to the Yemen state news agency, the United States has 
pledged to help fight against terrorism and “stand beside Yemen, its unity, security, and 
                                                 
7 Butters, “The Next Afghanistan?” 32. 
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stability.”8  After the decisive victory in the first phase of the war against al-Qaeda in 
Yemen, the United States turned its attention away from Yemen’s counterterrorism 
efforts and towards the regime’s political and economic problems.  The challenge for the 
United States now is how to strengthen Yemen’s capacity to combat terrorism by 
strengthening the government’s ability to counter the global jihadist threat as well as  
eliminate the grievances AQAP uses to gain support of a portion of the population while, 
at the same time, support needed political and economic reforms in the country.9   
Through studying the role of AQAP in Yemen, and examining the issues that will 
arise by the major research question, we will gain a much better understanding of the 
intentions and goals of al-Qaeda and AQAP in Yemen.  Yemen is going to continue to be 
used as a safe haven for al-Qaeda members, and the United States’ success in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is going to determine whether Yemen will be a staging point 
for al-Qaeda’s war against the West.  What the future holds for Yemen is going to rely on 
international support and the ability to stabilize the country so it can fight the threat of 
AQAP and global terrorism in Yemen. 
D. MAIN ARGUMENT 
This thesis will argue that the weak state characteristics of Yemen are just one of 
three main reasons why AQAP has been able rebuild in Yemen to become a viable 
terrorist threat in the country.  Yemen’s weak state characteristics, along with the failure 
of jihad in Saudi Arabia, and the lack of Yemeni political will to combat the threat of 
AQAP and its global jihadist agenda, have made the state an ideal location for the 
regional organization.  AQAP has been able to exploit these weaknesses and build strong 
ties with the Yemeni tribes in those areas of Yemen where the government has very little 
control.  The study argues that due to these circumstances, Yemen has the strong 
possibility of becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorism akin to al-Qaeda’s base 
in Pakistan today.  To combat the threat of AQAP in Yemen, the U.S., along with 
                                                 
8 Gerald F. Seib, “Threat Persists in Yemen, Somalia” The Wall Street Journal, 13 October 2009, 
Eastern edition, A2.   
9 Michael Knights, “U.S. Embassy Bombing in Yemen: Counterterrorism Challenges in Weak States,” 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1404 (24 September 2008).   
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regional and international powers, should continue to target the leadership of AQAP, help 
create stability by assisting in ending the two major internal conflicts in the country, 
address the underlying grievances of the population, and help institute a well-founded 
soft counterterrorism program.  Yemen does not have the capacity to combat the 
transnational threat caused by AQAP alone and, therefore, needs the assistance of 
regional and international powers to help eliminate the terrorist threat of AQAP in its 
country. 
E. ROADMAP 
This study will be organized in as straightforward a manner as possible to help 
understand the role of AQAP in Yemen and how and why it has been successful in 
rejuvenating the organization in the country.  The first chapter of the paper will focus on 
the history of Yemen in the twentieth century.  Yemen has only been a united country 
since 1990, and it is important to understand the context in which the northern part of 
Yemen and southern area of Yemen merged together to become the Republic of Yemen.  
Chapter II will also include a study of al-Qaeda’s history in Yemen up to its near total 
destruction in 2003.  Al-Qaeda has had an important role in Yemen in the last twenty 
years, and it is important to understand how they have been able to operate in the country.   
Chapter III will focus on AQAP in Yemen today.  It will examine its attacks, goals, 
political and theological stated objectives, and its links to its al-Qaeda leadership.  The 
section will also study the strategies being employed by AQAP to garner support among 
the people, and how it has learned from mistakes made abroad.   
Chapter IV of the thesis will study the many challenges that the Yemeni 
government faces today, and how they take away from their ability to combat AQAP.  
Chapter V will look at why Yemen has become a viable location for AQAP to operate 
from including its weak state characteristics, the success of Saudi Arabia against jihad, 
and the lack of political will of the Yemeni government.  The thesis will conclude with 
four recommendations that the United States should consider to combat the threat of 
AQAP in the country to prevent it from becoming the next Afghanistan.   
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II. HISTORY OF MODERN YEMEN 
A. FORMING A SINGLE STATE 
The Republic of Yemen celebrated its twentieth year as a united country in May 
2010.  Throughout most of the twentieth century, Yemen was divided into two separate 
countries. Their histories had differing paths that included foreign meddling, which 
played a major role in the development of two disconnected nations.  In 1990, the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) in North Yemen and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) in South Yemen merged to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY).  Yemen’s 
history in the latter half of the twentieth century has been entrenched with violence and 
civil war, and it is no wonder that today the Yemeni government has a myriad of 
problems that shake the foundation and stability of the nation.  Studying the past fifty 
years of Yemeni history in North and South Yemen clarifies the reasoning for many of 
the issues that a united Yemen faces today, and gives insight on how to resolve the 
problems that strike at the heart of its internal dilemmas.   
The British had a tremendous role in the history of Southern Yemen.  In 1839, the 
British captured the port city of Aden to use as a coaling station to protect their line of 
communications with India, which was their most important imperial possession at the 
time.  The British built treaty relationships with local leaders in the region to help 
safeguard their acquisition and even established protectorates over many of the local 
rulers.10  After the turn of the century, in 1904, a border was established between North 
and South Yemen between the British, who occupied South Yemen around Aden, and the 
Ottomans who had occupied Sanaa, and ruled North Yemen.11  Aden was ruled as a part  
 
 
                                                 
10 Thomas Kuhn, “Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference 
and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1919,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East 27, no. 2 (2007), 319. 
11 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 219. 
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of British India until it was made a crown colony in 1937.  The areas surrounding the port 
of Aden were made into two protectorates under the British and they continued their rule 
of Southern Yemen until the mid-1960s.12   
Northern Yemen was encompassed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 
1872, with the capture of Sanaa, until the end of World War I.  Though the Zaydi Islamic 
dynasties (Zaydi sect of Islam will be discussed in a later chapter) had governed Yemen 
directly and nominally from 897, from the sixteenth until the twentieth centuries most of 
Yemen’s territories were part of the Ottoman Empire.13  In 1911, a treaty between the 
Ottoman military forces in Yemen, and the Zaydi Imam Yahya made Imam Yahya  
A dependent ruler and Zaydi community leader under Ottoman 
sovereignty.  This agreement brought to a close more than two decades of 
fierce confrontation between the imam and his predecessors on one side 
and the imperial government in Istanbul on the other.14   
The agreement was seen as Imam Yahya’s first step towards building an 
independent Yemeni state, and after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, 
their forces finally withdrew from Yemeni territory in 1918.  Imam Yahya’s descendants 
remained the rulers of Northern Yemen until the early 1960s, when both Northern Yemen 
and Southern Yemen fought to gain independence from their monarchial rulers.   
The 1960s were a very tumultuous period in both Northern and Southern Yemen; 
that decade saw the intrusion of foreign nations in Yemeni affairs and the declaration of 
two distinctly independent states.  In Northern Yemen, tensions with the Zaydi dynasty 
had been prevalent for years.  Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948 in an unsuccessful 
coup attempt, and after the death of his son, Imam Ahmad, in 1962, his successor, Imam 
al-Badr, was deposed on 26 September 1962 by revolutionary forces. This event triggered 
a five-year proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  Imam al-Badr was deposed by 
                                                 
12 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Yemen,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (December 
2007) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm.  
13 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 13 
January 2010, 1.  
14 Kuhn, “Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and 
Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–1919,” 315. 
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junior army officers who established the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) with Colonel 
Abadallah al-Sallal becoming president of the newly-founded state.  Imam al-Badr and 
his royalist allies rallied against the new government, and it was soon clear to the 
republicans that they would not be able to survive without Egyptian assistance, which had 
helped the republicans in the months before the coup.  Egypt dispatched forces by early 
October, and “by early 1963, there were probably 15,000 in Yemen; six months later 
there were double that—and in every Yemen office, as offices were set up, was an 
Egyptian adviser without whom nothing was allowed to happen.”15  Saudi Arabia viewed 
an Egyptian-backed revolution on their border as a threat to their own monarchy and 
armed the royalists to defeat the republicans. 
By mid-1965, Egypt had nearly 60,000 troops in Yemen, and campaigns 
throughout Northern Yemen had cost Egypt a high number of casualties, though they 
controlled very little outside of Sanaa.  The proxy war went on between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia until 1967 with the defeat of the Egyptian army, by Israel, in the Six Day War.  
Soon thereafter, peace talks between Saudi Arabia and Egypt began.  An agreement was 
reached between the two countries in the second half of 1967 in which Egyptian forces 
would be removed from Yemen and Saudi Arabia would cease to aid the monarchists.16  
Though Egyptian and Saudi Arabian involvement in Yemen had ended, the war 
continued for three more years, until the eventual victory of the republicans in 1970, and 
the National Reconciliation between the royalists and the republicans in the north.   
While the republicans and royalists were fighting for sovereignty in the north, 
Yemenis in the south were demanding independence from the British who had ruled 
Southern Yemen around Aden for over one hundred years.  The southern grievances 
stemmed from the belief that British “imperialism wants a very large military base in the 
area to protect its interests and…exploit the resources of our country and thus raise the 
standard of living of the British people, while our own live a miserable and abject life.”17  
                                                 
15 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 89. 
16 Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Islamic Terror (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 109. 
17 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 96.   
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Fighting between Southern Yemenis and the British began in 1963 and was depicted as a 
war against colonialism.  Two rival nationalist groups formed in Southern Yemen and 
both turned to terrorism against the British in their attempt to control the country.  The 
Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) attacked the British with uncontrollable violence and the British eventually 
conceded, and in 1966, announced that they would leave Aden by 1968.   
The announcement of a British withdrawal from Southern Yemen did nothing to 
end the brutality by the Yemeni national groups against the British troops stationed in and 
around Aden as violence escalated after the announcement.  The FLOSY and the NLF 
even announced a short-lived alliance, backed by Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, who 
said, “the people must wage armed revolution against the enemy, in which they must pay 
the highest price of blood.”18  The alliance between the two rival nationalist groups ended 
at the end of 1966, but the violence did not.  Along with the continued aggression against 
the British, the two groups began murdering each other in growing numbers as well.  The 
British ended up withdrawing earlier than they had announced.  By the end of November 
1967, the British had completely left Aden; Southern Yemen was declared independent 
and renamed the People’s Republic of South Yemen.  The NLF immediately turned 
against the FLOSY and fighting erupted with the NLF emerging victorious and taking 
control of the government.  The NLF killed hundreds of people, purged all FLOSY 
elements from the army and police forces, and eliminated any civilians who opposed their 
rule.  Factions within the NLF then began to fight amongst themselves and, in 1969, a 
Marxist wing of the NLF gained power, changed the name of the country to the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and all political parties were merged into the 
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which became the only legal party.19  North and South 
Yemen were finally independently unified without any foreign interference in their 
governments, but Yemen as a whole still remained divided. 
 
                                                 
18 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 110. 
19 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Yemen.” 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the YAR and the PDRY were often 
strained and, though unification was discussed, little was done to forward the topic.  At a 
time when the Cold War was at its peak, the Marxist PDRY developed strong ties with 
the Soviet Union and other countries in the Eastern Bloc, and in the late 1970s, the YAR 
began to develop ties with the West, though it had relations with the Soviets as well.  In 
1972, a border war broke out, and again in 1979, “war broke out between the Yemens, 
and the southerners took a number of towns beyond the border.”20  In response, President 
Carter of the United States, who did not want to appear to look weak on Communism, 
sent tanks and the most modern weapons to Sanaa to combat the Communist 
encroachment.  The dispute was soon brought to an end by Arab states, and the presidents 
of both countries promised to strive towards unity between the Yemens.   
During the two decades after independence, the Yemen Arab Republic depended 
heavily on migrant labor.  Workers left the YAR and moved to Saudi Arabia, which was 
in the midst of an oil boom.  Is it estimated that of the North’s total population of 5.3 
million people in 1975, about 630,000 of them were migrants working in the oil industry 
in Saudi Arabia.  Remittances to the YAR were $40 million in 1969–70, $800 million in 
1976–77, and stood at $1.3 billion in 1978–79.  Whole quarters of Jiddah and Riyadh 
were Yemeni as workers stayed in the oil state and worked in the flourishing economy to 
make money to send back to their native country.  The huge amounts of money sent 
home by Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia far exceeded the revenue that the central 
government could produce.21  The government in Northern Yemen did nothing to tax the 
remittances and had little ability to raise money internally and, therefore, depended 
heavily on foreign aid and debt.  The YAR was promised $300 million by Iraq in 1979, 
and President Saleh was even granted a palace in Iraq by Sadaam Hussein.  In the south, 
the PDRY also depended heavily on aid and loans.  Though the Soviet Union contributed 
financial support to the PDRY, it depended on many of the same institutions as the North 
for financial support, including Kuwait, the World Bank, and Abu Dhabi.22   
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Both Yemens relied upon other countries to support them through loans, aid, and 
remittances as, until 1984, Yemen had the misfortune of being the only Arabian state not 
to have found oil.   
Suddenly, in November 1989, Ali Abdullah Saleh (President of YAR) and Ali 
Salim al-Bidh (President of PDRY) agreed to a draft unity constitution, and the Republic 
of Yemen (ROY) was declared on 22 May 1990.  Saleh, who was also general secretary 
of the General Popular Congress (GPC), which ruled in the North, became president of 
the new republic and al-Bidh, who was the general secretary of the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP) in the South, became vice-president.  The unity accords outlined a 
transitional period where the two parties would split power equally in the government 
until general elections could be held, even though the South only made up one-fifth of the 
total unified Yemeni population.23  After 150 years of separation, it looked as though 
unification might finally bring prosperity to the Yemeni state and people, but the 
honeymoon period did not last long, and Yemen was thrown onto the world stage with 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.   
On 02 August 1990, Iraq, under the dictatorship of Sadaam Hussein, invaded its 
small southern neighbor, Kuwait.  Often in history, this would have had little to no effect 
on the happenings in Yemen but, at this time, a unified Yemen had the great misfortune 
to be a member of the United Nations Security Council.  Yemen was the only Arab state 
among the 15 members and, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was condemned, Yemen 
remained the one abstention.  Yemen stood behind the decision of Sadaam Hussein and 
when the other Arab countries accepted a Western presence on their soil to combat the 
aggression of their Iraqi neighbor, Yemen went the opposite direction.  The Yemeni 
contingent in the Security Council urged an Arab solution, which showed support for 
Iraq.  In response to Yemeni support of Iraq, on 19 September “the Saudi government 
revoked the special status of Yemenis within the Kingdom.  Hundreds of thousands, 
obliged often to sell at derisory prices whatever they could not take by truck, were forced 
home.”24  Many other Gulf states followed the lead of the Saudis and expelled the 
                                                 
23 Bipartisan Policy Center, “Fragility and Extremism in Yemen,” February 2010, 19. 
24 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 185.   
 13
Yemeni population residing inside their borders; as many as 800,000 Yemenis returned to 
Yemen.  The United States also cut off ties with the newly unified state.  The subsequent 
consequences saw a disintegration of foreign remittances and the foreign aid income the 
Yemeni government depended on, not to mention the overflow of the 800,000 newly 
returned Yemenis to a Yemeni economy that had no jobs for them.25  The decision to 
support Iraq during the Gulf War put Yemen in a difficult position internationally, and 
the next step for the newly unified state was to conduct elections and attempt to create a 
unified government that could govern effectively.   
In April 1993, elections took place for the first time in Yemen.  President Saleh’s 
GPC party won 123 of the 301 seats in the new parliament.  The YSP only garnered 56 
seats, less than the 62 seats won by the Islah Party, which consisted of various tribal and 
religious groups.  The YSP claims to share power equally were now made relatively 
weak by their performance in the elections.  A parliament vote was soon cast to create a 
five-member Presidential Council, with the YSP gaining only one seat.  Conflicts in the 
coalition soon arose and continuous negotiations between the Northern GPC and the 
Southern YSP solved very little.  Civil war broke out in late April 1994 and, on 21 May, 
Southern leaders declared secession and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (DRY).  The international community did not recognize the DRY.  Most of the 
fighting was done in the South, and by 07 July, Aden was sacked and the civil war 
essentially ended with President Saleh and the North as victors, keeping the nation 
unified.  Thousands of Southern leaders and military leaders went into exile, but during 
the early fighting, President Saleh announced a general amnesty, and most of those who 
went into exile returned shortly.26  The unification of Yemen was safe for the time being, 
but the civil war had implications that last even today.   
The civil war in Yemen in 1994 was not North versus South, but rather between 
political parties, mainly the General Peoples Congress (GPC) versus the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP).  Those living in the South did not see it that way though, and because most 
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of the fighting was done in the South, they saw it as a Northern invasion, and Northern 
legitimacy is still a recurrent theme today.27  In the wake of the victory,  
Saleh tightened the regime’s grip of the country’s natural resource 
wealth—most of which is located in the former South Yemen—purged 
most southerners from his patronage networks, and placed northerners in 
charge of the south’s economy and security.  This was made all the easier 
by the fact that the former South Yemen’s oil infrastructure was just 
coming online by the early 1990s.  During the war, Saleh’s security 
services helped deepen the north-south divide by recruiting so-called 
“popular armies” of tribesmen, itinerant jihadists, and former mujahedin 
as proxy militias to help prosecute the war against the South.28 
Soon after the end of the war, amendments to the constitution eliminated the 
presidential council and President Saleh was elected by Parliament to a five-year term on 
01 October 1994.  In 1999, Yemen held its first direct presidential elections, and elected 
President Saleh to another five-year term.  In 2000, an amendment was made to the 
constitution to change the term of presidency to a seven-year term and in 2006, President 
Saleh was elected once again to lead Yemen.29  President Saleh has held power in North 
Yemen since 1978 and has ruled the unified Republic of Yemen (ROY) since 1990.  His 
government has been known for being corrupt, ineffective, and incompetent.  Today, 
Yemen is a weak state that faces many crises and its ability to govern all the territories 
within its borders causes great concern for the international community.   
Yemen’s modern history has been marked by foreign powers using Yemen for 
their own interests, and today, in the world, it is distinguished by the fact that it is once 
again being used.  This time, not by a foreign nation, but by al-Qaeda, a transnational 
organization that is using Yemen as a breeding ground for extremism, and a base for its 
local branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).   
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B. HISTORY OF AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN 
Yemen, as a breeding ground for terrorism and terrorist attacks, first came to the 
public spotlight in the United States after the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole that 
killed 17 U.S. sailors. The destruction of the two towers at the World Trade Center and 
the attack on the Pentagon less than a year later by al-Qaeda, quickly stole attention away 
from terrorism in Yemen.  Since 11 September 2001, the United States has been engaged 
in two wars in the Middle East and the terrorist threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen was quickly 
forgotten.  On 02 January 2010, President Obama commented on the plot to blow up a 
Northwest Airlines flight over American soil on Christmas Day 2009, and nine years 
later, Yemen once again has the attention of the United States.  President Obama declared 
that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian, traveled to Yemen where “he 
joined an affiliate of Al Qaeda and that this group, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to attack that plane 
headed for America.”30  The threat of terrorism in and from Yemen has now, once again, 
attracted the interest of the United States and other Western nations.   The threat of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was articulated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation when he said, “as the Christmas day attempted bombing illustrates, the 
threats we face are becoming more diverse and more dangerous with each passing day.”31   
Although the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni and Saudi 
Arabian affiliate of al-Qaeda in the Gulf is a relatively new threat, the threat of al-Qaeda 
in the area is not.   Al-Qaeda has been operating in Yemen for nearly twenty years with 
their first attack on U.S. interests occurring in 1992.  After the al-Qaeda bombing of the 
USS Cole, the United States was successful in the dismantling of the al-Qaeda leadership 
in Yemen.  By 2003, there were few remnants of al-Qaeda in Yemen, but since 2006, al- 
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Qaeda has been able to conduct numerous attacks against Western citizens and their 
interests, and with the attempted Christmas Day bombing, Yemen is again relevant in 
U.S. counterterrorism operations. 
The creation of the al-Qaeda organization took place sometime in 1988 in 
Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam.  Osama bin Laden was born 30 
July 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  His father had migrated from the Hadrahmat in 
Yemen to Saudi Arabia and was a wealthy construction magnate who had risen from 
poverty.32  It is believed that bin Laden adopted militant Islamic views while studying at 
King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  He studied under Muhammad 
Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, a key ideologue in the Muslim Brotherhood and for violent 
Islamic revolutionaries.  Another one of his instructors at the university was Abdullah 
Azzam, who is identified as the intellectual architect of jihad against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan.33  Soon after the December 1979 Soviet invasion, bin Laden 
went to Afghanistan to rid a Muslim territory and people of a non-Muslim power. 
While in Afghanistan, bin Laden used his own funds to support the Afghan 
mujahedin, and established himself as a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for 
the war.  Bin Laden and Azzam together created a network of offices to recruit and fund-
raise in the Arab world, Europe, and the United States.  The network, the Afghan Service 
Bureau (MAK), is today seen as the forerunner of al-Qaeda.  MAK catered primarily to 
the foreign mujahedin, and  
In addition to recruiting, indoctrinating and training tens of thousands of 
Arab and Muslim youths from countries ranging from the US to the 
Philippines, MAK disbursed $200 million of Middle Eastern and Western, 
mainly American and British, aid destined for the Afghan jihad.34   
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Throughout the 1980s and the fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
bin Laden was not known to have openly promoted or planned any attacks against the 
United States, though he and his companions were very critical of the U.S. support for 
Israel.35  
Sometime in 1988, toward the end of the Soviet occupation, bin Laden and 
Azzam began calling their volunteer organization al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the base”) and 
contemplated how the organization would be utilized.  Azzam’s goal for the organization 
was to “create an Islamic army akin to an international rapid-reaction force that would 
come to the rescue of Muslims wherever and whenever they were in need.”36  In 
Azzams’s analysis, jihad would remain an individual obligation until all other lands that 
were Muslim were returned so that Islam would reign once again.  Bin Laden differed 
with Azzam on the role of the new organization and wanted to dispatch the al-Qaeda 
members to their home countries to attempt to topple secular regimes and pro-Western 
Arab leaders, such as Mubarak in Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s royal family.  Some attribute 
the differences to the influence of Egyptians in bin Laden’s inner circle, who wanted to 
use the resources of al-Qaeda to topple the Egyptian regime and install an Islamic state.37  
Bin Laden was very popular with the fighters in Afghanistan and gained 
tremendous respect for leaving his affluent life to live with the Afghan peasants and Arab 
fighters.  His “wealth, influence, and fearlessness made him a natural leader of the Arab 
mujahedin—most of whom were Saudis, Yemenis, Algerians, and Egyptians—in the late 
1980s.”38  Then, in November 1989, Azzam was assassinated and bin Laden became the 
uncontested emir of al-Qaeda.  Bin Laden returned home to Saudi Arabia in 1989, after 
the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 02 
August 1990 bin Laden turned from a relative ally of the United States against the Soviet 
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Union to one of the United States’ most determined enemies.  Bin Laden petitioned the 
Saudi officials not to allow U.S. combat troops in Saudi Arabia, and instead, allow him to 
use his Islamic army to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait.  His idea was opposed by the 
leadership in Saudi Arabia and led to a falling out with the Saudi royal family.  Instead, 
500,000 U.S. troops deployed to Saudi Arabia to conduct “Operation Desert Storm” to 
drive out the Iraqis in early 1991.  Although only a relatively small number of U.S. forces 
remained in Saudi Arabia after the operation, bin Laden and his followers saw the U.S. 
forces as occupiers of sacred Islamic land, and the Saudi royal family as facilitators to the 
occupation.39   
After bin Laden’s disagreement with the Saudi royal family, he received an 
invitation from the National Islamic Front (NIF) to move to Sudan.  Bin Laden, after 
studying the situation in Sudan, accepted the invitation from the spiritual head of the NIF, 
Hasan al-Turabi, whose party had come to power in 1989.40  In Sudan, al-Qaeda bought 
property and set up areas to host and train al-Qaeda militants to use against the United 
States and its interests around the world.  They also trained for operations in the Balkans, 
Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines.  After planning and conducting numerous 
operations from Sudan, including the attempted assassination of the president of Egypt, 
Hosni Mubarak, international pressure increased on Sudan to expel bin Laden from the 
country.  The United States began increasing military assistance to Sudan’s hostile 
neighbors of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.  Ultimately, Sudan caved in to international 
pressure and bin Laden was asked to leave Sudan.  In May 1996, bin Laden returned to 
Afghanistan where he assisted the Taliban in defeating the Northern Alliance for control 
of the country.  In return for his assistance, bin Laden was given an al-Qaeda sanctuary 
and was provided “weapons, equipment, and training facilities.  Furthermore, Al Qaeda 
was permitted to use Afghanistan’s national aircraft to transport members, recruits, and 
supplies from overseas.”41  Bin Laden remained in Afghanistan until the U.S. invasion in 
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2001, after the World Trade Center bombings and, today, is still believed to be living in 
the area on the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
Al-Qaeda began to play a role in Yemen because of the Afghan-Soviet War.  
During the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, many Yemenis embraced the 
cause of the Afghan rebels and backed their Muslim brothers against the invading 
Soviets.  It is estimated that some 30,000 volunteers left Yemen for Afghanistan from 
1979 to 1989.42  The Yemeni government, as well as the U.S. government as an 
extension of the Cold War, supported the Yemenis to fight as mujahedin against the 
Soviets, who backed the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in Southern Yemen at 
the time.  Throughout this period, “U.S. officials perceived the volunteers as positive 
contributors to the effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and U.S. officials made 
no apparent effort to stop the recruitment of the non-Afghan volunteers for the war.”43   
While doing their part to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan, some gained battle 
experience and many were indoctrinated by al-Qaeda’s jihadist ideology. After the Soviet 
withdrawal and the end of the war in Afghanistan, many of the radicalized Yemenis 
returned to Yemen and became its vanguard of radical Islam.  A key figure in the 
formation of radical Islam in the country was Sheikh Abdul al-Zindani, a senior Islamic 
religious leader in Yemen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  He was a central 
activist in recruiting Yemeni volunteers to fight in Afghanistan and even took part in 
combat against the Soviets.44  Al-Zindani met and became acquainted with bin Laden 
during his time in Afghanistan and is still believed to be the theological advisor to bin 
Laden today.45  The Yemeni Afghans built upon the relationships formed in Afghanistan, 
and became the “basis for the al-Qaeda network that exists in Yemen today.”46 
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In the past, Yemen had been seen as a bus stop, not a headquarters for al-Qaeda.  
It has been used as a place to stash and rest fighters and where smaller operations have 
taken place.  After the return of the Yemenis who fought in the Afghan war, al-Qaeda 
began to establish bases of operations within Yemen as it took advantage of the nation’s 
fragmented authority.  Yemenis returning from the fighting in Afghanistan began setting 
up training camps in the late 1980s and bin Laden recognized the fertile ground for al-
Qaeda in Yemen and even considered moving his base of operations there.  Though the 
move of the base never came to fruition, Yemenis are still estimated to be the third-
largest nationality represented in al-Qaeda, behind only Egyptians and Algerians.47  
In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen united to form the Republic of Yemen, with President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
becoming president, though unity did not bring greater stability.  Hostilities broke out 
between the central government and those who attempted to reestablish southern 
independence in 1994.  President Saleh was able to quell the rebellion much because of 
his ability to acquire the help of Islamist fighters who wanted to defeat the atheist 
communists.  The Afghan alumni viewed the campaign as an extension of the war in 
Afghanistan against the Soviets, as the north represented Islamic leanings, and the south a 
Marxist regime.  After the northern victory, President Saleh rewarded the Afghan alumni 
by incorporating their leaders, such as al-Zindani, who had formed the Islamic Islah 
party, into the government.48  The government allowed the al-Qaeda element in Yemen 
to operate freely during the 1990s and early 2000s.  While Western interests were 
suffering attacks at the hands of Islamic terrorists in the region, there was a question as to 
what the true relationship between the Yemeni government and al-Qaeda consisted of. 
From 1992 until the dismantling of the al-Qaeda leadership in Yemen in 2003, 
Yemen served as a location to conduct attacks against the West, especially United States’ 
interests.  Al-Qaeda’s first official attack took place in December of 1992, in Aden, 
Yemen.  Bin Laden decided to organize a series of attacks against U.S. targets in Yemen, 
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mainly in response to U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia, particularly.   
The plan was to detonate explosives “at hotels in Aden where American military 
personnel usually stayed, as well as attacks against U.S. targets at the Aden airport and 
seaport.”49  Bin Laden decided to use a Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate group, Islamic Jihad of 
Yemen to conduct the operations.  The Islamic Jihad of Yemen was founded from the 
influence of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and many of their members had fought in 
Afghanistan.  They shared the same objectives of al-Qaeda leadership in Sudan, wished 
to establish an Islamic state in Yemen and rid the Arabian Peninsula of foreign 
influences.  On 29 December 1992, explosions at the Aden Hotel and the Golden Moor 
Hotel killed three, and wounded five.50  The bombs were “intended to kill U.S. troops en 
route to Somalia on a U.S. relief mission, but the troops had already left the premises.”51  
Another terrorist cell was detained near the fence of the Aden Airport as it was about to 
launch RPG rockets against U.S transport planes parked there. Bin Laden was satisfied 
with the Aden attacks as he believed they conveyed the message to the U.S. and served as 
a warning against American involvement in the Muslim world.52 
The next major attempted attack against Western interests in Yemen occurred in 
December 1998 by the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), another local al-Qaeda affiliate 
group, who had splintered from the Islamic Jihad of Yemen. On 23 December, three 
terrorists were arrested in a car loaded with explosives on their way to conduct an attack 
against the British consulate.  As a result of the interrogation, three other cell members 
were arrested and a safe house was captured that contained mines, rocket launchers, 
computers, and encrypted communication means.  Further investigation showed that they 
had planned a series of attacks against British and American targets inside Yemen.  They 
planned “attacks on Christmas Eve against Western targets in Aden including the British 
consulate in Aden, an Anglican Church, and a group of Americans dealing in the removal 
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of mines from Yemen who lived in the ‘Movenpick’ Hotel in Aden.”53  The attacks were 
thwarted before they could take place, but the IAA was still able to conduct a major 
attack five days later. 
Shortly after the spoiled Christmas Eve attack, 16 Western tourists (12 British, 2 
American, and 2 Australian) were kidnapped while touring the Abyan Province in Yemen 
60 kilometers northeast of Aden.  Their convoy was attacked by an armed group, and on 
29 December 1998, a spokesman for the IAA stated his organization had kidnapped the 
tourists and demanded several conditions for their release, which included the release of 
members of their group, the cessation of U.S. and British aggression against Iraq, and the 
banishment of U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula.54  The Yemenis refused to meet 
the demands of the kidnappers and after Yemeni security forces found their hiding place 
and stormed the stronghold, three British citizens and one Australian were killed and two 
other tourists, one of them an American, was wounded.  Three of the kidnappers were 
killed, and three wounded.55  Though there were over 100 kidnappings of foreign 
residents in Yemen in the 1990s, this incident was the largest and one of the few that 
ended in the death of some of the hostages. 
The next major successful attack against United States’ interests in Yemen, which 
brought the spotlight to al-Qaeda in the country, was the bombing of the United States’ 
destroyer, the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden.  The attack was a “full-fledged Al-Qaeda 
operation supervised directly by bin Laden, who chose the target, location, and the 
suicide bombers and provided the money.”56  The first attempted attack on an American 
destroyer was on 03 January 2000, when a skiff overloaded with explosives set out to 
intersect the USS The Sullivans, which was moored in the Aden port for refueling.  The 
attack was unsuccessful, though, because the boat bomb sank shortly after it set out as it 
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was overloaded with explosives and exceeded its load capacity.  The miscalculation by 
the al-Qaeda operatives caused a 10-month postponement of the attack on the high-
profile U.S. target.57  On 12 January 2000, a fiberglass boat, filled with over a half a ton 
of explosives, was steered into the USS Cole by two al-Qaeda operatives while making 
friendly gestures to the crew.  The blast ripped a hole in the side of the destroyer killing 
the 17 U.S. sailors, as well as the 2 al-Qaeda operatives, and wounded 40 others.58 
Two other major al-Qaeda attacks occurred in Yemen before al-Qaeda was nearly 
destroyed in the country in 2003.  The first attack was against the French oil tanker 
Limburg on 06 October 2002.  Much like the attack on the USS Cole, a small boat bomb 
approached the Limberg, which was moored several miles off the Yemeni coast, and 
collided with the ship causing a huge explosion, setting the ship on fire, and injuring 12 
of the crew and killing one.59  The attack caused thousands of barrels of oil to spill into 
the ocean, producing severe environmental consequences.  The attack also hurt the 
economy because of the drop in port usage and hikes in insurance rates because of the 
threat in the area.  The last attack against Western targets in Yemen, before al-Qaeda was 
thwarted for several years, was when a Yemeni militant entered a hospital in south 
Yemen and killed three American doctors in December of 2002.60    
After the attack on the USS Cole, the Yemeni government was slow to cooperate 
with the United States in their investigation; the U.S. believed that Yemeni’s security 
apparatus was infiltrated by al-Qaeda and that the country was a safe haven for al-Qaeda- 
affiliated groups.  Yemen’s unwillingness to cooperate marked a low point in U.S. 
confidence in Yemen as a counter-terrorism partner, but after the 11 September attacks 
against the U.S., the Yemeni government made a change in course and offered their 
assistance to the global war on terror.  The Yemeni government, under President Saleh, 
may have begun cooperation for fear it would become a target of the war against 
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terrorism, like the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Whatever the case may be, the Yemeni 
government began cracking down on terrorism and arresting anyone suspected of having 
ties to al-Qaeda.  The United States increased its training and operational support to the 
Yemeni military, and terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies were foiled in 2001 and 
2002.61  The Yemeni government worked closely with U.S. intelligence services, 
“coordinating the November 2002 strike on al-Qa’ida’s head in Yemen, ‘Ali Qa’id al-
Harithi, which was conducted by an unmanned CIA drone.”62  Throughout 2003, 
Yemen’s counter-terrorism unit captured 92 high-value targets, including al-Harithi’s 
successor, Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal in November of the year.63  After the success of 
dismantling the al-Qaeda leadership in Yemen in 2002–2003, by the end of 2003 the 
Yemeni government and the U.S. seemed to consider the counter-terrorism mission 
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III. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP) 
The war against al-Qaeda in Yemen can be characterized by two distinct phases.  
The near destruction of al-Qaeda in Yemen by the end of 2003 marked the end of the first 
phase of war against al-Qaeda in the nation.  After the success against the terrorist 
organization, the Yemeni government and the United States turned their attention 
elsewhere.  Al-Qaeda looked largely defeated in Yemen with most of “the group’s 
leadership dead or in jail, its infrastructure largely destroyed and the militants still at 
large more attracted to the fighting in Iraq than to a dying jihad at home.”64  Yemen, who 
historically has seen Islamic militancy as more of a Western problem than that of a 
problem of its state, turned its focus to the internal dilemmas that they faced.  It began 
focusing its resources on the Houthi Rebellion in the northern part of the country and the 
threats of secession from southern Yemen.  The Yemeni leadership saw these problems 
as security issues that actually challenged the existence of its regime, whereas al-Qaeda 
did not.   
The United States turned its attention away from the threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen 
as well, focusing on the two wars it was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.  After the al-
Qaeda threat in Yemen was considered eliminated, the United States prioritized 
democratic reforms and anti-corruption campaigns in Yemen under the Bush 
administration.  In November 2005, the United States suspended Yemen from the USAID 
program, and World Bank cut aid from $420 million a year to $280 million a year 
because of rampant corruption throughout the government.65  The threat of al-Qaeda in 
Yemen was ignored, and when the organization was inactive in the country it went 
unnoticed, but when al-Qaeda made a reemergence in Yemen in 2006, the lapse in 
caution against the terrorist group turned out to be a serious miscalculation.   
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To understand the reincarnation of al-Qaeda in Yemen, or al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as it is known today, it is necessary to study the make-up of 
the organization, its grievances and ideology, and its links to transnational jihadists, as 
well the message the organization is disseminating.  Studying, also, the strategy and goals 
of the al-Qaeda organization in Yemen may produce answers as to how the United States 
and other interested nations could combat the dangerous threat.  The following section 
examines each of the topics listed in order to gain a better grasp on what Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula is capable of and how their aspirations can be thwarted. 
A. REEMERGENCE, GRIEVANCES, AND GOALS 
The reemergence of al-Qaeda in Yemen began when 23 al-Qaeda operatives 
escaped the PSO Central Prison in Sanaa through a tunnel connected to a mosque on 03 
February 2006. This event can be seen as the start of the second phase in the war against 
al-Qaeda in Yemen, a war that is still ongoing today.  Many of the escapees were 
Afghanistan veterans, members of the Harithi network, and had been involved in attacks 
against the West, though most were being held without being charged for any specific 
crimes.  After the escape, the United States put tremendous pressure on the Yemeni 
government to track down and capture Jamal al-Badawi and Jabir al-Banna, who were 
both on the United States’ most-wanted list, but it was two escapees that the United 
States did not know about who would rekindle al-Qaeda in Yemen.  The two escapees 
who would become the leaders of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen were Nasir al-
Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi.  Since the outbreak from prison, these two leaders have 
led and expanded the al-Qaeda organization in Yemen and have been the main force 
behind attacks against Western interests inside of Yemen.66 
Both leaders of AQAP have ties to Afghanistan, and today, share a strong 
ideological connection to the al-Qaeda leadership there. The man at the front of AQAP, 
Nasir al-Wahayshi, is a 33-year-old Yemeni from the province of al-Baida.  He studied in 
religious institutes before leaving Yemen for Afghanistan in 1996, eventually serving as 
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bin Laden’s secretary.  Al-Wahayshi fought at the Battle of Tora Bora before fleeing to 
Iran, where he was arrested by Iranian authorities and then extradited to Yemen in 2003.  
He remained in a Yemeni prison until his escape in February of 2006.  Qasim al-Raymi, 
who serves as the military chief in AQAP, has a history similar to al-Wahayshi’s.  Al-
Raymi is a 32-year-old Yemeni from Sanaa, who also fought in Afghanistan and claims 
to have met bin Laden as well.67  Upon his return to Yemen, he was arrested in 
connection with a series of explosions in Sanaa in 2002 and charged with being a 
member of a cell planning to attack five embassies in Sanaa.  He was sentenced to five 
years in prison before escaping along with al-Wahayshi.68  A third leader, who plays an 
important role in AQAP, is Said al-Shihri.  Al-Shihri is a 36-year-old Saudi and is al-
Wahayshi’s deputy in the organization.  He also traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and 
served as an al-Qaeda facilitator in Iran.  He was arrested in 2001 near the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, and was later transferred to the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.  In November 2007, he was transferred to Saudi Arabia, where he participated in 
their terrorist rehabilitation program.  Upon graduating the program, he left for Yemen 
and has been there since the beginning of 2009.69  Under the leadership of these men, 
AQAP has been rebuilt from almost complete destruction in 2003, mostly because its 
message is resonating with part of the Yemeni population.   
Since the start of the second phase, al-Qaeda has gone through three clear stages 
of development in Yemen.  The first stage began after the escape from prison and lasted 
throughout 2007 and consisted of when “al-Wahayshi and al-Raymi worked to resurrect 
the organization up from the ashes, essentially taking a long view of their project in 
Yemen and laying a durable foundation.”70  The second stage began in January 2008, 
when the group launched their bi-monthly online journal Sada al-Malahim (Echo of 
Battles) and followed it with attacks throughout the rest of 2008.  The third stage began 
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in January 2009 when the group became a regional organization by merging with the 
Saudi Arabian branch of al-Qaeda to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).71  
AQAP has evolved as an organization since the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branch, 
and though a regional organization, through the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a 
Northwest Airlines flight to Detroit, they have proven they are capable of global attacks.   
The first stage of the reemergence of al-Qaeda within Yemen consisted of a 
renewal of attacks against Western interests shortly after the prisoners escaped as the 
organization aimed to rebuild and make itself relevant in the country once again.72  The 
first was dual failed suicide bombings against oil and gas facilities in Marib and 
Hadramawt in September of 2006.  This early failure was soon eclipsed by a more 
professional attack on 02 July 2007 in the governorate of Marib.  A suicide bomber 
attacked a convoy of Spanish tourists, killing nine people.  The attacks showed that the 
new generation of al-Qaeda inside of Yemen is intent on attacking Western interests, and 
is not afraid of another government crackdown like what happened after the bombing of 
the USS Cole in 2000 and the 11 September bombings in 2001.73  The first stage of 
development of al-Qaeda in Yemen transitioned into the second phase as it began to build 
a stronger foundation and disseminate its agenda throughout the region through the 
publication of Sada al-Malahim. 
Since the publication of the first issue of Sada al-Malahim in January 2008, the 
online journal has been used as a propaganda machine for the organization.  The journal, 
which usually runs between 50 and 70 pages, is  
More than just a religious journal that praises the glories and duties of 
jihad.  It details tactics to stymie interrogation techniques, runs reviews of 
assault rifles, analyzes the causes of the recent American recession, and 
even quotes political analyst Pat Buchanan.74 
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AQAP uses the online journal to disseminate their goals and strategy, and most of 
the contributors are either members of AQAP or their relatives.  What makes Sada al-
Malahim different from other publications that al-Qaeda affiliates have published is that 
it is the first to be put out on a reasonably reliable schedule over the last two years.  As of 
March 2010, there have been twelve publications and throughout the different sections of 
the journal there are  
published interviews with terrorist leaders, fighter biographies, tips on 
how to become a better al-Qaida foot soldier, lists of terrorists held by the 
Yemeni government, and thought pieces on the role of women in jihad.  It 
also publishes fan mail.75  
Most importantly, AQAP uses the magazine to exploit local grievances and the group’s 
stance on many issues is popular with much of the population. 
AQAP, under the leadership of al-Wahayshi, has been able to resonate with the 
population because it has been able to tie itself into the larger jihadist framework while 
tailoring its narrative to the local audience.  The leadership has developed an astounding 
ability to finesse its ideological message to relate to different audiences within the 
Arabian Peninsula.  One issue of the online journal discussed a recently published list of 
Saudi Arabia’s most wanted terrorists and the alleged rape of Muslims by U.S. soldiers in 
Iraq.76  By linking the two events, the group was able to tie the atrocities of the West to 
the governments they believe to be apostate.  AQAP also frequently alleges that its men 
have been tortured in Yemeni prisons and exploits this issue with the local tribes who are 
also weary of the Yemeni government.  Another article in Sada al-Malahim linked oil 
extraction to tribal concerns, arguing that oil in Shabwa, Hadramawt, and Marib was 
being exploited by the government and the West at the expense of the local population.77   
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AQAP, through Sada al-Malahim, seeks supporters by discussing problems that 
afflict Muslims everywhere, but its true target audience is Yemenis and Saudis.  It 
focuses on the socioeconomic difficulties in the two societies while combining its effort 
with a religious flavor. In Yemen, AQAP “emphasizes the nation’s widespread poverty 
while lamenting the increased prices for basic staples.”78  It claims that the president and 
those around him are to blame for the corruption in the country and the squandering of 
Yemen’s natural oil wealth and that the interests of the state do not concern the 
government, whose only interest is remaining in power. The group has also stated that it 
will not rest until the last unbeliever has been driven from the Arabian Peninsula.  AQAP 
urges Yemenis to join its cause and justifies its position on attacking Westerners from a 
famous hadith urging Muslims to expel polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula.79  The 
grievances that AQAP focuses on are striking different parts of Yemeni society as it is 
the most representative organization in Yemen.  AQAP transcends class, tribe, and 
regional identity in a way that no other organization or political party in Yemen is able to, 
and their success should be very alarming to the United States. and other Western 
countries.80   
Through Sada al-Malahim, AQAP has been able to match its words with action.  
Each release of the first few issues of the publication was followed by an attack and the 
journal provides justifications that “are both political and theological, and manages to 
target both what they see as the apostate regime of Ali Abdullah Salih and the far devil of 
Islam’s western enemies.”81  The first issue of Sada al-Malahim, in January 2008, was 
immediately followed by an attack on a convoy of Belgian tourists that killed two 
Yemenis and two Belgians.  Upon the dissemination of their second issue of the 
magazine, another attention-grabbing attack took place when the U.S. embassy in Sanaa 
was the target of three mortars that fell short of the embassy, killing a Yemeni guard and 
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wounding several girls at a school located nearby.82  The attack was the first of three 
indirect fire attacks against Western compounds in Sanaa between March and April of 
2008.  In 2008, it favored the policy of a constant offense of small attacks against tourist 
convoys, army checkpoints, oil fields, and housing compounds for foreigners because it 
knows that no one major attack will force Westerners to leave Yemen.  The culmination 
of attacks against Western interests came on 17 September 2008 when al-Qaeda affiliates 
attempted to storm the U.S. embassy in Sanaa.  The attack consisted of two suicide car 
bomb attempts and failed to breach the embassy wall before a four-man team rushed the 
embassy disguised as local security forces and wearing suicide bomb vests.  The attackers 
failed to breach the U.S. embassy, but seventeen people were left dead, including one 
American woman.83  The attacks during 2008 showed that al-Qaeda within Yemen had 
been able to rebuild and was intent on attacking Western interests inside Yemen, and its 
objectives only seemed to grow from there.    
Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Saudi al-Qaeda branch announced their merger to 
form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in January 2009 under the leadership of 
Nasir al-Wahayshi.  Al-Wahayshi’s counterparts in Saudi Arabia pledged allegiance to 
him, and this event has shown that Yemen has risen to ascendancy on al-Qaeda’s target 
list.  Al-Wahayshi’s close ties to bin Laden may allow al-Wahayshi to “steer the 
organization in the direction that al-Qa’ida central would wish without the need for 
explicit direction from Pakistan’s tribal areas.”84  Under the leadership of al-Wahayshi in 
2009, AQAP made tremendous strides in rebuilding the organization, clarifying its goals, 
and resonating with the population in Yemen.  When combined with the Saudi branch of 
al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Yemen went from a local al-Qaeda affiliate to a major regional 
branch of the organization.  AQAP’s strength, growing ability to conduct major attacks, 
and sheer desire to attack Western interests was proven throughout 2009, and once again, 
Yemen gained the attention of the world because of terrorist activity.   
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In 2009, AQAP conducted several major attacks, and through its actions have 
shown that its objectives are not only to attack Western interests in the Arabian 
Peninsula, but that it is willing and able to attack globally.  On 15 March 2009, AQAP 
struck a group of tourists once again.  A suicide bomber killed four South Koreans along 
with their Yemeni guide and just three days later, a suicide bomber targeted the South 
Korean delegation sent to investigate the previous attack.  AQAP claimed they were 
killed partly in revenge for their government’s cooperation against Islamic terrorism as 
well as the role tourists have in corrupting Muslims morals.  It does seem that the 
justifications for the attack came afterwards, though.  An important take away from the 
two attacks was the fact it was the first time an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist in Yemen 
used his body as a weapon.  It shows that AQAP is learning from tactics used elsewhere 
and is using other means of terrorism to conduct their operations.85  In August 2009, 
AQAP launched what would have been a high profile assassination if it had succeeded.  
A suicide bomber approached Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s 
counterterrorism chief and deputy minister of the interior, with PETN explosives in his 
rectum, and then detonated the explosives as he neared bin Nayef.  The attack was 
unsuccessful though because it was believed that his body absorbed most of the 
explosion, and bin Nayef survived.86  The Christmas Day bomber would use a similar 
tactic in late 2009. 
AQAP’s goals remain the same as its parent organization in Pakistan in repelling 
foreigners from Muslim lands and establishing an Islamic Caliphate, but its focus is on 
the Arabian Peninsula. The August 2009 edition of the online journal asserted that its 
“main goal was to unseat the regime in Saudi Arabia, noting that Yemeni President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s grasp on power was weakening.”87  It is seeking to destroy the existing 
political system and establish its own, and has called on skilled laborers to help establish 
an Islamic state in Yemen.  A weakened Yemeni government provides AQAP with the 
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area to recruit and build the groundwork for the future.  The concern for the U.S. is 
AQAP’s ability to create a framework in which to operate should the al-Qaeda leadership 
be forced to flee their hideouts in Pakistan and move to Yemen as their next base of 
operations.  Al-Qaeda could spin the move as a win for its organization because it was 
able to survive an onslaught by the most powerful nation in the world and was still a 
viable organization, arguing that God must be on its side.  American officials are 
reporting that they are seeing the first evidence of dozens of al-Qaeda operatives and 
some of the group’s leaders leaving Pakistan’s tribal areas and moving to Yemen and 
Somalia.88  Though none of the al-Qaeda leaders are top leaders, the report suggests that 
Yemen is becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda members and that their ability to resonate 
with the population to create areas to operate from should be cause for major concern for 
both the Yemeni government and the United States.   
B. YEMENI TRIBES 
AQAP has been very successful recently in linking itself with the tribal elements 
in Yemen.  In the past, al-Qaeda has not had strong alliances with the tribes in Yemen, 
but recently, the piety of al-Qaeda members has resonated with tribesmen.  AQAP has 
learned from the mistakes made by other al-Qaeda affiliates in other regions in the 
Middle East and worked carefully to cultivate ties to the local population.  For example, 
in Iraq, the local al-Qaeda affiliates “tortured and executed local men who refused to 
fight with them.  They assassinated top tribal leaders working with the U.S. backed 
government.”89  The tribes ultimately rebelled against the organization and drove al-
Qaeda out of the safe havens it was operating in.  By building strong relationships with 
different tribes in Yemen, AQAP has areas to train and operate and the tribe provides 
protection from government troops.  AQAP has been able to integrate into the tribal 
regions of Yemen most notably by attempting to marry into local tribes.  In the August 
2009 edition of Sada al-Malahim, a congratulatory notice was inserted announcing the 
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marriage of one of AQAP’s leaders and a local tribeswoman.90  AQAP is establishing 
roots in Yemen from which it can expand its capability to recruit locals.  The more 
intertwined with the tribes AQAP becomes, the more difficult it is going to be counter its 
threat without causing a larger crisis.   
AQAP has also attempted to appeal to tribal honor to gain the support of the 
important tribesmen.  AQAP’s al-Raymi has suggested that any tribal sheikh who 
supports the president does not represent Yemeni tribes and betrays his forefathers.  Al-
Wahayshi has called on the tribes to resist the pressure of granting state control of their 
territories and even al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has called on 
Yemen’s tribes to support their cause: 
I call on the noble and defiant tribes of the Yemen and tell them: don’t be 
less than your brothers in the defiant Pushtun and Baluch tribes who aided 
Allah and His Messenger and made America and the Crusaders dizzy in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan… noble and defiant tribes of the Yemen…don’t 
be helpers of Ali Abdullah Salih, the agent of the Crusaders… be a help 
and support to your brothers the Mujahideen.91 
Yemen is not a very modern state, and it is very weak in many parts of the nation 
where the tribal elements live.  Yemen lacks strong institutions to provide for the 
citizens’ needs and instead it relies on the patronage system to satisfy them.  Just because 
the government cannot enforce law in many parts of their country, does not mean law 
does not exist.  Tribes have their own system of governance and play a very important 
role in Yemeni society.  The “tribal sheikhs are pillars in both the traditional and the 
patronage systems, although in the latter the regime detaches them from the communities 
by offering wealth and status in exchange for political acquiesce.”92  In some areas, 
AQAP is attempting to detach the sheikhs who have been co-opted by the government 
and blame the state’s violence against the tribes on tribal sheikhs who have turned against 
their responsibilities and traditions to defend the tribe.  As the economic resources of the 
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government dwindle, it is going to have less and less ability to support its patronage 
systems and the tribes are more likely to aid AQAP fugitives. 
AQAP also uses local grievances to build support by focusing on the fact that the 
government provides little for them, even though most oil revenues derive from their 
areas.  AQAP has begun providing basic services to the locals who have been neglected 
by the government.  It has “dug wells for the community, paid for medical treatments for 
locals, and is even paying monthly allowances to poor widows in the community.”93  It is 
not known how widespread AQAP’s social welfare efforts are, but its growing ability to 
provide services that the government cannot provide should be cause for great concern.  
There was even one report that stated tribesmen in Shabwa were so frustrated by the 
government’s efforts to supply them with teachers for their schools, they turned to 
AQAP.  Groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt have used the ability to provide social services to the people as a 
great tool to garner support for their organizations, as well as recruit members for their 
cause against what they believe to be illegitimate regimes.  Through their shared 
experiences, marrying into the tribes, and political and ideological messages resonating 
with Yemeni tribes, AQAP is creating a sphere of influence where the Yemeni 
government has no control.  The strengthening of a relationship between AQAP and the 
tribes causes even greater concern because any attempt by the government to quell the 
terrorist organization in the future may turn into a war of the Yemeni government versus 
the tribesmen.94 AQAP understands the tribal role in Yemen and is doing much to exploit 
the distrust of the government, by the tribesmen, in an attempt to further gain an area 
where they can operate as they wish. 
C. COMPOSITION 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a regional organization, and its composition 
of members reflects that.  Though no one knows the exact number of AQAP in Yemen, 
the foreign minister for Yemen said he thought that around 200–300 al-Qaeda members 
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were operating inside Yemen, though many more support it.95  According to a report in 
the Terrorism Monitor, Yemenis form the majority with 56 percent, followed by Saudis 
at 37 percent, and foreigners make up roughly 7 percent of the organization inside 
Yemen.96  The Yemeni recruits are equally distributed between northern and southern 
tribes and “al-Qaeda’s area of influence forms a large triangle that is half the size of the 
country.”97  Yemen has become a destination for Saudi jihadis as well, after the Saudi 
crackdown on the organization following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  
AQAP is attempting to recruit from southern Saudi Arabia to the south of Yemen and the 
tribal ties it is creating are helping it to do so.  In most of the areas Yemen is recruiting, 
tribes are still in control and, as stated above, the ability of their message to resonate with 
the tribal population has helped al-Qaeda build a safe haven at the strategic level in 
Yemen.98  The organization also benefited from the government’s overreaction after 
9/11, arresting any citizen suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda.  When released, these 
young men were often more radical than when they entered prison and were easy recruits 
for AQAP upon their exit from incarceration.  The Yemeni government also pushed 
many Yemenis to join AQAP after it was released that the government allowed the 
United States to carry out the attack in Yemen that killed al-Harithi.  The more successful 
the organization is in conducting attacks the more recruits it is going to be able to enlist 
to join its cause.99  The large recruiting pool of unsatisfied Yemeni citizens and the 
ability to build relationships with the tribal elements in Yemen have made AQAP a 
formidable terrorist organization whose capacity to conduct attacks against the Yemeni 
government and Western interests has grown over time.     
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D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
On 25 December 2009, Yemen was once again put center stage in the war against 
al-Qaeda after the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam 
to Detroit.  The suspect, a 23-year-old Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was 
overpowered by other passengers in an unsuccessful attempt to detonate explosives sewn 
into his underwear while the plane was approaching Detroit.  Abdulmutallab received 
training, and may have received the explosives in Yemen under the guidance of AQAP, 
weeks before the attempted attack.100  Abdulmutallab had studied at El Eman University 
in Sanaa at the same time radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was giving lectures at the 
school in 2004 and 2005.  Abdulmutallab returned to Yemen last summer, where it is 
believed he headed to AQAP training camps.  He left Yemen on 04 December 2009, but 
before he left, he went to Shabwa Province, a rugged area, where AQAP is believed to be 
operating from, to meet members of the organization.101  
The attempted attack was significant because it was the first attack by AQAP that 
was attempted outside of the Arabian Peninsula.  Most experts before the attack believed 
that AQAP did not have this capability, and their focus would be against Western targets 
inside their region.  The attack shows that the AQAP is growing in capability, and is 
willing to go after the U.S. on their own territory.  The leaders of AQAP have preached 
taking the fight to Western countries, but it seems the organization’s capability may have 
finally matched their ambition.  In a recent issue of Sada al-Malahim, al-Wahayshi  
“urged his followers to use small bombs ‘in airports in the Western crusade countries that 
participated in the war against Muslims; or on their planes, or in their residential 
complexes or their subways.’”102  Al-Wahayshi’s deputy, al-Shihri has also called on 
Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula to wage jihad against Christians and Jews in the 
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Arabian Peninsula and to blockade the Red Sea to cut off U.S. shipments to Israel.103  
AQAP’s new generation of leaders are intent on attacking the U.S. and its interests, 
wherever they may be, and unlike other terrorist threats, so far AQAP has been able to 
match their words to actions and, thus, the U.S. as well as other Western countries, 
should act to halt the growth of the organization and eliminate it from Yemen. 
The U.S. government recognized the threat in Yemen from AQAP shortly before 
the Christmas Day attack.  In the two weeks before the Christmas attack, the United 
States and Yemen “coordinated a trio of strikes against al-Qa’ida targets in the 
country.”104  The United States was reported to have provided firepower, intelligence, 
and other support to the government of Yemen to strike at the al-Qaeda hideouts.105  The 
attacks were aimed at taking out the leadership of AQAP, but it appears that none of the 
major leaders of AQAP were captured or killed during the raids.  AQAP said that the 
Christmas Day bombing was in retaliation for the strikes, but it seems highly unlikely 
based on the timeline of Abdulmutallab’s travel.  Since the Christmas Day attempted 
bombing, the U.S. and Yemeni governments have worked together intimately to strike at 
possible AQAP camps and hideouts and prevent the organization from mounting attacks 
against U.S. and other foreign targets inside Yemen. In an attack on 14 March 2010, the 
Yemeni government acknowledged air strikes against al-Qaeda targets in the south of the 
country.  It is not known how effective the Yemeni air strikes are, as local residents have 
stated that as many as twenty civilians were killed in the latest raid.106  AQAP is also 
turning the new fight to thwart its organization as a reason for its own violence against 
the U.S. and Yemeni governments.  Its military commander, al-Raymi, posted a message 
on a militant Web site that said, “Today, you have attacked us in the middle of our 
household, so wait for what will befall you in the middle of yours…We will blow up the 
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earth from beneath your feet.”107  Trying to eliminate AQAP elements in Yemen is the 
correct path to take for the United States, but it must be done along with mitigating the 
factors that make AQAP a popular choice among the Yemeni population.   
The single person who is getting the most attention in the United States, since the 
reemergence of AQAP in Yemen, is U.S.-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.  He is 
believed to have ties to the Christmas Day bomber and U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, 
who killed 13 people and wounded 30 others at Ft. Hood in Texas in November 2009.  
Awlaki’s relationship status to AQAP is unclear, but it appears he may be a part of the 
spiritual branch of AQAP.  He spent most of his life in the United States until leaving in 
2002 for England, and then moving to Yemen in 2004.  He is from a powerful family in 
the province of Shabwa, where he is believed to be living under the protection of his 
tribe.  Awlaki can act as the face of Western Muslims because of his understanding of the 
West, and can be used as a huge recruiting tool to attract other Western Muslims to the 
organization.108  Awlaki has even issued a fatwa, permitting the killing of American 
servicemen, and was recently quoted as saying, “I eventually came to the conclusion that 
jihad (holy struggle) against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding upon 
every other able Muslim.”109  His true ties to AQAP are not conclusive though, because 
he has not published in Sada al-Malahim or issued recordings in the name of AQAP. 
Awlaki’s connection to AQAP stems from his overt promotion of jihad and criticism of 
the United States, as well as his link to the last two major terrorist attacks against the 
United States.  Awlaki’s relevance to AQAP operations may be minimal, but his 
capability to relate to Western Muslims could be a major factor in recruiting for the 
organization.    
Since the escape of the twenty-three al-Qaeda members from a Yemeni prison in 
2006, al-Qaeda has been able to completely rebuild itself into a formable organization in 
Yemen under the AQAP.  They are no longer on the run and are able to operate freely in 
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many areas.  They forced the closing of the U.S. embassy for two days in early January 
for fear of an imminent attack.110  AQAP has also caused the U.S. Navy to issue 
warnings to ships sailing in waters near Yemen because of the threat of seaborne 
attacks.111  The al-Qaeda threat in Yemen seems, once again, viable and what strategy the 
United States and other Western countries will take to combat the threat is going to 
determine whether AQAP will continue to flourish.  The success of the AQAP, under the 
leadership of al-Wahayshi, has been possible through the message they have been able to 
disseminate through their online publication Sada al-Malahim.  Its goals are to rid 
Muslim lands of Western influence and to weaken the Yemeni government even further 
so it can have a greater area to operate from.  AQAP’s message has been aimed at the 
local population, focusing on grievances that Yemenis face, while at the same time not 
losing their global jihadist message.  The success in building relationships with the 
Yemeni tribes has also increased its influence in the region while, at the same time, given 
AQAP an area to maneuver and build its strength.  The threat that AQAP poses is 
growing, and now that it has accomplished the goals of rebuilding, it may look to conduct 
further attacks globally.  The more unstable the Yemeni regime becomes, the easier it is 
going to be for AQAP to operate, and it opens the possibility of Yemen becoming the 
next headquarters for the al-Qaeda leadership if it is forced out of the tribal regions of 
Pakistan.  AQAP has been able to rebuild, recruit, and once again become relevant in 
Yemeni society since their near destruction in 2003.  The ability of AQAP’s message to 
resonate with the Yemeni population should not be overlooked, and if they continue to 
grow in the territories governed by the tribes in Yemen, and take advantage of the 
weakened Yemeni government, the al-Qaeda organization may have its next nerve center 
to conduct operations from.  
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IV. CHALLENGES FACING THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been able to make a remarkable recovery 
since operations that dismantled their leadership from 2002–2003 because the Yemeni 
government changed their priorities to combat the other major domestic challenges that 
they face.  Along with the growing threat of AQAP in the country, there are other major 
domestic challenges that threaten the existence of the regime.  The first major challenge 
facing the Yemeni government is the Houthi rebellion in the northern area of Yemen.  A 
recent cease-fire was put into action on 12 February 2009, and President Saleh said the 
pact was “a sign that the war has ended and that this is not just a passing truce.”112  This 
is not the first cease-fire between the two parties and it is necessary to understand the 
conflict in northern Yemen that has taken so many resources away from combating 
AQAP, and which threatens to flare up again.  The second major challenge facing the 
Yemeni government, to date, is the secessionist movement in southern Yemen that stems 
from grievances from the civil war in 1994.  The movement has grown in the last year, 
and it is threatening the existence of the current state by calling for the separation of 
North and South Yemen.  The third challenge facing the Yemeni government is the 
convergence of economic and demographic problems that are causing political unrest and 
instability in the country.  Yemen is the poorest state in the Arab world, and the high 
unemployment is creating a breeding ground for new members of AQAP.   
By studying the major challenges that Yemen faces today, we can gain a better 
understanding as to what conditions have allowed AQAP to reemerge and become a 
viable threat in Yemen once again.  The Yemeni government has focused much of their 
resources in the last several years against combating the Houthi Rebellion and southern 
secessionists because they viewed the two challenges as hazards to the existence of their 
regime.  It is no coincidence that during the same time period, AQAP has been able to 
build itself up from near destruction and become active in Yemen once again.  The two 
major rebellions, along with the economic and demographic challenges, have forced the 
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Yemeni government to change their priorities and overlook the threat of AQAP.  These 
challenges, along with AQAP, have created a nation that is on the verge of disintegrating 
and must be understood in order to help Yemen overcome the dire consequences that it 
faces as a country.   
A. HOUTHI REBELLION 
The first major challenge the Yemeni government has faced in the last several 
years is the Houthi insurgency that started in the province of Saada in northern Yemen.  
The cause of fighting in the conflict began in 2004 when the government attempted to 
arrest the leader of the group Shabab al-Moumineen (Believing Youth Movement), 
Hussein al-Houthi, for criticizing the government’s ties to Sunni extremists and the 
United States.113  Al-Houthi, a Zaydi cleric, urged the Yemeni government to stop 
supporting the United States in the war on terror and his actions prompted “anti-
government demonstrations by members of the Believing Youth Movement.  Militants 
disrupted mosque services in Saada, shouting anti-government, anti-American, and anti-
Israeli slogans.”114  The protests moved to the capital of Yemen, Sanaa, and to put a halt 
to the unrest, President Saleh invited al-Houthi to Sanaa to discuss the grievances of the 
Believing Youth Movement, as well as those of the Zaydi population in northern Yemen.  
Al-Houthi refused the invitation to Sanaa, and President Saleh decided to quell the unrest 
with other measures, by attempting to arrest or destroy the leader.115  This event started 
the warfare between the Yemeni government and the Zaydi Shia, and since 2004, the two 
have gone through six rounds of fighting.116    
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To understand the extent of the conflict, a brief overview of the Zaydis in Yemen 
must be given.  Zaydis are Shia, but they have little in common with the other Shia 
groups (like those in Iran), and are sometimes called the 5th Sunni school of 
jurisprudence.  They are sometimes referred to as “fivers” because “they split from the 
other four Sunni groups over disputes about the legitimacy of the fifth Imam.  They are 
known for being very moderate and the closest to Sunni Islam of all the Shi’a sects.”117  
Zaydis differ from other Shia because after the Iman Ali Zain al-Abidin, the Zaydis 
recognize his younger son, Zayd, as the next Imam, instead of his older brother, 
Muhammad al-Baqir.  They believe that as long as a man can trace his lineage back to the 
Prophet Muhammad and has the arms and supporters to ensure his rule, and he can rule 
justly according to the Koran, he is able to be the Imam.118  The Zaydis ruled northern 
Yemen from 893, when the first Yemeni Imamate was established.  The Yemeni Imamate 
lasted over 1,000 years in various forms until the 1962 revolution and the following 
eight-year civil war.  The Saada region was the last region to submit to the republican 
government and both sides have been skeptical of each other ever since.119 
The first round of fighting between the government and the Houthis lasted from 
June to September of 2004, when the Yemeni government attacked Believing Youth 
Movement strongholds to arrest or kill al-Houthi.  Yemeni forces used tanks and 
warplanes to go after the Zaydi cleric, and the fighting was fierce, with a suspected total 
death toll of 130 in the first week.  He was wanted for “harming Yemen’s stability and 
interests,” and the Yemeni government eventually succeeded in killing Hussein al-Houthi 
on 10 September 2004, along with some of his supporters.120  The Yemeni government 
considered the rebellion over with the death of al-Houthi, and began their withdrawal, but 
their belief that the rebellion was taken care of was a miscalculation, as the Believing 
Youth used the government withdrawal to consolidate its forces.  Since September 2004, 
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there have been six rounds of fighting and each successive round has only seemed to 
inflame the conflict.  After the death of Hussein al-Houthi, the movement took the name 
of their fallen leader and his three brothers assumed the leadership role of the insurgency, 
while his father became the group’s spiritual leader.121 
Though the fighting erupted due to the targeting of the Believing Youth 
Movement leader, al-Houthi, the origins of the conflict have deeper roots and are a 
combination of competing sectarian identities, regional underdevelopment, perceived 
socioeconomic injustices, and historical grievances.  The conflict is worsened by the 
tensions between the Zaydi Shia population and the Sunni Salafi fundamentalists, who 
the government has used to help quell the rebellion.122  Throughout the 1990s, the two 
religious sects clashed with each other as Salafists “destroyed Zaidi tombs and attempted 
to convert Zaidi youth.”123  The Houthis see themselves as defenders of their community 
against an alliance between the government and the Salafis, an alliance that they see is 
determined to extinguish their culture.  The Houthis do not believe that the president of 
Yemen, who happens to be a Zaydi Shia, has the right to rule Yemen any longer because 
he has betrayed his Shia faith, evident in his political favoritism to Sunni members of 
government.  They are against the current Yemeni regime under President Saleh, and any 
involvement between the government and the United States. By pandering to the United 
States in allowing the conduct of counter-terrorism operations in Yemen, President Saleh 
has made himself illegitimate.  The Houthi movement believes that a Shia Imam should 
once again lead Yemen and that it is their responsibility to install the Imamate again by 
overthrowing the current regime.124 
Over the course of the five-year conflict, the most effective tactics used by the 
Zaydi insurgents have been ambushes, sniper attacks, and small to medium-sized 
bombings, but the insurgents have evolved from purely guerilla warfare to a combination 
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of guerilla warfare and urban terrorism.  Most of the Yemeni army has seen combat in 
Saada, and the insurgents have “directed their most vicious military campaign against the 
Yemeni army and police forces.  So far, they have killed at least a thousand Yemeni 
security services personnel” during the campaign.125  In May 2008, they attacked a 
mosque in northern Yemen that was frequented by the Yemeni military, government, and 
police personnel, including those close to the president.  The Yemeni government has 
sought to combat the insurgency through a strategy of arresting political activists, 
roadblocks/vehicle checkpoints, artillery and air strikes, and a food blockade.  The 
insurgency has also displaced an estimated 130,000 people.126  It is also estimated that 
the number of rebel and civilian dead range from 3,700 to 5,500 and is rising.127 
The Houthi insurgency has not only caused turmoil in Yemen, but it has also 
caused controversy throughout the region.  The Houthis recently invoked intervention by 
neighboring Saudi Arabia as three months of fighting, from November 2009 to the end of 
January 2010, ended in rebel offered cease-fire.  The Saudi intervention came after the 
Houthis “had killed a Saudi border guard and infiltrated a string of villages in early 
November.”128  The Houthis attacked the Saudi positions after accusing the kingdom of 
helping the Yemeni government in its attempt to defeat the rebellion.  During the three-
month conflict between the Houthis and the Saudis, 109 Saudi soldiers were killed, and 
over 1,500 Yemenis were captured by Saudi forces.129  The Yemeni government has also 
mixed words with Iran, consistently arguing that the Iranian government has supported 
the Houthi insurgency.  Yemen claims that Iran supports the movement monetarily and 
politically in an attempt to create proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and the United States.  
There is little evidence that there is any direct Iranian involvement in the Houthi 
insurgency and one leader of the Houthi rebellion, Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi, has asserted 
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that Iranian involvement is untrue and that there is no Iranian support and no Iranian 
weapons are involved in the fighting.130  It does seem that Iran has provided moral 
support to the rebels, though, even to go so far as to warn the Saudis not to “pour oil on 
the fire” by intervening in the Yemeni problem.131  At the same time the Yemeni 
government has attempted to link the Houthis to Iran, they have also tried to tie them to 
both al-Qaeda and the southern secessionists in order to tie their internal security 
concerns to the larger security threat that has attracted the international community. By 
doing so, the Yemeni government has tried to portray its campaign against the Houthis in 
the north as counterterrorism efforts against fundamentalist insurgents in order to garner 
support for their actions.132     
The Yemeni government and the Houthis were able to agree to a truce on 12 
February 2010, and though minor skirmishes happened shortly after the declared cease-
fire, since then both sides have been able to meet the conditions of the agreement.  The 
Houthis accepted the six conditions proposed by the Yemeni government that included 
freeing all prisoners, opening roads in the north, withdrawing from government buildings, 
returning weapons seized from security forces, and handing over captured army posts.  
They have also pledged not to attack Saudi Arabia and to respect and obey the Yemeni 
constitution.133  The Yemeni government is also set to free a number of Houthi rebels, 
estimated at several hundred, in order to implement conditions they agreed to in the 
cease-fire.  The cease-fire to date has been held, but this is not the first time the two sides 
have agreed to end hostilities in the six years of fighting. 
Though both sides have met the conditions of the cease-fire to this point, it is 
unlikely the truce will last.  In June 2007, the Qatar government mediated a joint cease-
fire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and in 2008, the two sides met in 
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Doha to sign a peace accord.  Peace was short lived in both instances, and “renewed 
heavy fighting soon rendered the peace accord obsolete.”134  Optimism is hard to sustain 
about the recent peace agreement because the truce does not address the rebels’ 
complaints of discrimination and neglect by the government.  Until these grievances are 
addressed, fighting is likely to flare up once again.  Even the president of Yemen was 
quoted as saying, “whenever we stop military operations and release their prisoners, they 
prepare themselves again for fighting.”135  If the fighting reignites once again, it will 
continue to take away resources from combating the threat of AQAP in the country and 
Yemen cannot spare the estimated $200 million of foreign currency reserves per month 
that were being used to fight the Houthis.136  The Yemeni government will see the 
Houthi insurgency as a threat to the existence of the government and it will remain the 
highest priority for the government until it is finally eliminated. 
B. SOUTHERN SECESSIONISTS 
The second major challenge facing the Yemeni government is secessionists in 
south Yemen, known as the Southern Movement.  What started in 2007 with peaceful 
protests led by former military officers, who said they were mistreated and denied 
pensions after the 1994 civil war, has evolved into erratic fighting between southerners 
and Yemeni security forces.137  Recent protests in the south have led to deaths during 
clashes between the southern separatists and security forces, and on 11 March 2010, three 
separatists were killed and thirteen were wounded during such a confrontation.138  The 
escalation of violence is cause for great concern in a country already riddled with other 
security concerns.  Any diversion of resources from the fight to combat AQAP in Yemen 
hinders any attempt to quell the AQAP threat and allows the terrorist organization more 
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areas to operate freely.  The Southern Movement is radicalizing in their ideology and 
actions, and the Yemeni state needs to resolve the issues between them and the southern 
separatists before the Movement creates another civil war that threatens the existence of 
the state. 
Since the creation of the unified Yemeni state, there have been problems for 
residents of the south including “issues of national identity, economic grievances, and 
concerns over access to political power.”139  The unity process, after the unification of 
North and South Yemen, failed to solve basic problems that southerners had and the 
problems linger today.  Citizens in southern Yemen have argued that the northern-led 
government has marginalized them both socially and economically, and the southern 
issue resurfaced in September 2007 following the protests by former southern military 
officers.  Along with exclusion from government jobs and services and little economic 
development, southern leaders believe the north has not stood by commitments to 
improve conditions in the south after the civil war in 1994.140  They also claim that the 
wealth generated from southern oil fields is disproportionately distributed by the regime 
in an attempt to repress the southern people.  Many southerners today perceive 
themselves to be subject to internal colonialism by the north, and what started as a list of 
grievances has now escalated to calls for southern secession and the establishment of an 
independent southern republic.141  
In 2007 and 2008, the protests in southern Yemen were overwhelmingly peaceful, 
as the leader of southern military retirees, Nasir Ali an-Nuba, emphasized the need for 
peaceful, weapons-free sit-ins.  The demands of the protests were moderate as well, as 
the Southern Movement called for equality with citizens in the north, more jobs, more 
local decision-making power, and more control over southern economic resources.  The 
government responded by arresting an-Nuba and several of his collaborators.142  As the 
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protests grew from hundreds to tens of thousands, the government used greater levels of 
repression, security crackdowns, arrests, episodes of violence, and the closure of southern 
newspapers to halt the southern aspirations.143  In October 2007, security forces shot and 
killed four men.  The next month they killed two more protesters in Aden and, four 
months later, government forces killed and injured dozens during protests in two southern 
provinces.  The southerners see the repression as just another sign of abuse by the 
northern regime, which refuses to allow southerners to be equal citizens.  As the 
government has become more repressive of the demonstrations, even moving pieces of 
heavy artillery and weaponry into the south to squash the opposition, the Southern 
Movement reacted in kind, and the movement is becoming a violent struggle against the 
regime. 144   
What began as calls for reform in the context of unity has moved to demands for 
independence, and these demands are growing more popular in the south.  The Southern 
Movement has become more radicalized and, starting at rallies in 2009, demonstrators 
began waving the flag of the former South Yemen and calling for secession.  One 
Southern Movement leader, Sahra Saleh Abdullah, has even said it is too late for reforms 
and that the South has the right to defend itself and form an independent southern 
state.145  The movement gained tremendous momentum in April 2009 when one of 
President Saleh’s former allies, Sheikh Tareq al-Fadhli, announced that he was joining 
the Southern Movement, and was in favor of an independent southern state.  The 
announcement was important because al-Fadhli was a part of Saleh’s inner circle in the 
1990s and was a Yemeni Afghan who helped Saleh consolidate power after the 
unification of the country.  His joining of the Southern Movement showed the growing 
disconnect between the south and the northern regime.   
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The Southern Movement has no official centralized leadership and, as of January 
2010, there were at least five similarly named organizations claiming to represent the 
southern people.146  The movement includes a number of powerful tribal figures as well 
as Aden-based intellectuals and political figures, and there is a 42-member leadership 
committee, though it is unclear how many people it represents.  Most supporters, 
including Sheikh al-Fadhli, seem to acknowledge Ali Salim al-Bidh, the exiled former 
president of South Yemen, as their leader.147  Al-Bidh emerged from years of silence 
saying that the unification of North and South Yemen had failed and that the south would 
succeed in regaining their independence no matter the cost.148  The situation in south 
Yemen is growing increasingly dangerous, and unless leaders in the south and the regime 
are able to come to an agreement that satisfies both sides, Yemen is headed towards a 
civil war that could throw the country into further disarray.   
President Saleh and his government have tried to link the southern secessionists to 
al-Qaeda, much like they have done with the Houthi rebellion, to garner international 
support for their domestic security problems. Though AQAP’s leader, al-Wahayshi, has 
declared support for the southern cause, southern leaders have rejected any association 
with AQAP.149  AQAP’s support of the Southern Movement has little to do with the 
support of their ideological grievances, but they see the movement as another weakening 
force on the regime and as an opportunity to strengthen and operate without fear of 
reprisal in the regions they occupy.  President Saleh has recently welcomed dialogue with 
the southern leaders to discuss any political demands, while at the same time increasing 
the crackdown on the secessionists.  He was quoted as saying, “The separatist flags are 
going to burn in the coming days and weeks,” on 8 March 2010, just a day before he 
called for dialogue.150  
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Much like the Houthi rebellion, the Yemeni government sees the Southern 
Movement as a threat to its existence and is allocating resources towards combating the 
threat.  The longer the dilemma lasts, the more resources are being taken away from the 
ability to combat the threat of AQAP within the country.  The movement is further 
weakening the Republic of Yemen and allowing AQAP to take advantage of the 
deteriorating situation.   
C. ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES 
If the domestic security challenges were not enough for the Yemeni government, 
they are also facing a myriad of economic and demographic challenges as well.  The 
worsening economic situation makes it more and more difficult to hold the country 
together.  With diminishing resources and a growing population, the government’s ability 
to provide basic services to its people is becoming more complicated and, along with the 
domestic security challenges that Yemen faces, the regime has a legitimate chance of 
collapsing in the not-too-distant future.  If Yemen reaches the point of collapse and 
becomes a failed state, AQAP’s ability to thrive and operate would be able to grow 
exponentially.  The economic and demographic challenges that Yemen faces cause a 
serious threat to the stability of the regime and it is necessary to understand them if 
Yemen is be strengthened to combat the explosive threat of AQAP within the country. 
1. Poverty and Unemployment 
Yemen is the poorest state in the Arab world, with an annual per capita income 
under 900 U.S. dollars and nearly half the population earns less than two dollars per 
day.151  About 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and more than 
half of the children suffer from malnutrition, mainly due to the fact that 5 million 
Yemenis go hungry each day.152  The Yemeni economy has never fully recovered from 
the major events that happened in Yemen and the Gulf in the 1990s.  The Yemeni labor 
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market was unable to absorb the tremendous influx of nearly a million Yemeni migrant 
workers that were expelled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states after the Yemeni 
government’s refusal to employ international forces to expel Iraq from Kuwait.  Also, the 
civil war in 1994 not only expended valuable resources, but also damaged the 
infrastructure of the southern provinces, much of which has not been fixed.153  The 
lingering affects of events in the 1990s, along with a weak economy and lack of 
development, have caused an unemployment rate in Yemen conservatively estimated at 
35 percent.  The unemployed can be exploited by extremist elements such as AQAP and 
thus Yemen’s economic difficulties help contribute to their security concerns.154  
Yemen’s security problems and economic failings are working together in a vicious cycle 
that only leads Yemen into further turmoil. 
2. Dwindling Oil Resources 
Oil exports are essential to the Yemeni government, as they generate 75 percent 
of government revenue.  The major problem with oil in Yemen, though, is that it is 
running out.  Oil exports in Yemen have dropped from 450,000 barrels per day in 2003 to 
around 280,000 barrels per day in January 2009 and the Energy Information 
Administration expects oil output to decrease even further, to 260,000 barrels per day, in 
2010.  It is estimated that Yemen has proven crude oil reserves of 3 billion barrels as of 
January 2010.155  Many energy experts believe that oil exports for Yemen will cease to 
exist in a decade and the World Bank estimated that by 2017 the government of Yemen 
will earn no income from oil.  The rapidly decreasing oil reserves, along with the fall in 
global oil prices, have had a severe impact on the Yemeni economy, and though the 
increase in oil prices over the last seven years was able to mask the decreasing 
production, the prices of oil per barrel have decreased since they peaked in 2008.156   
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The government relies heavily on their oil revenues, and when prices peaked at 
$147 per barrel in July 2008, it was able to compensate for the decrease in oil production.  
During the first quarter of 2009, Yemeni sales have averaged $47 per barrel, and the loss 
of government revenue is being felt throughout the country.  In early 2009, the Finance 
Ministry ordered budget cuts of 50 percent throughout the whole bureaucracy, but the 
government also relies heavily on the oil exports to maintain its informal patronage 
system.  It is possible that in the near future the government may not be able to pay the 
salaries of civil and military personnel.157  There was interest in licensing for exploration 
in Yemen’s offshore areas in 2007, but the escalation of piracy in the Gulf of Aden in 
2008 and 2009 has thwarted such attempts to explore possible offshore oil sites.158   
The Yemeni economy, which is not in good shape to begin with, is heading 
towards disintegration.  The Yemeni government depends heavily on oil revenues to fund 
state expenditures and the dwindling oil resources in Yemen are going to further hinder 
the government’s ability to govern its own territory.  Yemen is going to be even more 
dependent on international assistance unless the Yemeni government begins to prepare 
for a post-oil economy.  If the economy is not able to provide jobs for the people, the 
more likely extremists groups like AQAP are going to be able to recruit, and the security 
threats and the government’s ability to combat them will only worsen.  
3. Water and Qat Crisis 
Even more worrisome than dwindling oil resources is the fact that Yemen is 
running out of water.  According to government reports, renewable fresh water amounts 
to 2.5 billion cubic meters, while the annual consumption is 3.4 billion cubic meters.159  
These numbers mean that Yemen is using water faster that it can naturally be replenished.  
Water is getting harder and harder to come by in Yemen and “the market price of water 
has quadrupled in the past four years, pushing more and more people to drill illegally into 
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rapidly receding aquifers.”160  In rural areas, only 45 percent of people get their water 
from the government, and in the Taiz province, water is supplied by the government only 
once every 45 days.  The lack of supplied water leads people to drill illegal private rigs, 
which further deplete the water table because there is no regulation on water consumption 
from these illegal rigs.161   
The reason for the crisis is the result of several factors, including rising domestic 
consumption, poor water management, and wasteful irrigation techniques, but a major 
cause of a depletion of water in Yemen is because of the cultivation of qat.  Qat is a 
stimulant whose leaves are chewed every day by most Yemeni men, and it uses nearly 40 
percent of water resources consumed by agriculture.162  Qat is the easiest way to make a 
profit for Yemeni farmers, so when they are in need of income, they open up water taps 
to irrigate the fields.  After weeks of irrigation, qat leaves can be harvested and sold the 
same day, which is much more profitable than other crops.  The more water given to the 
qat plant, the more productive it will be, so there is no incentive to conserve water for 
other needs.  So much land is devoted to qat cultivation that the country’s ability to grow 
its own food has decreased and Yemen is now a net food importer.163  The weak 
economy and qat cultivation go hand in hand, which only makes water problems in the 
country worse.  The lack of water in Yemen, once again, shows the government’s 
inability to provide basic necessities for its people.  Farmers cultivate qat because it is the 
easiest way to produce a profit in a struggling economy.  The economic challenges facing 
Yemen are magnified by its depleting resources and as the government is able to provide 
less and less for the people, the Yemeni state is going to weaken even more as the 
population turns elsewhere to meet its basic needs. 
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4. Growing Population 
Along with a failing economy, the demographics in Yemen pose a serious threat 
to the weakening state.  Yemen has a population near 24 million people and is among the 
world’s highest in growth rate, at 3.4 percent.  The result is that two-thirds of the 
population is under the age of 24.  The population is expected to double in the next 20 
years to over 40 million people, which will only magnify the economic problems they are 
facing today.  The Yemeni labor market already cannot produce enough jobs to satisfy 
the 25,000 people who enter it each year.  As the population expands, and the Yemen 
economy weakens, more and more Yemenis are going to be without jobs.  The growing 
population will also decrease the water resources even more, and Sanaa may be the first 
international capital in the world without water.164  
5. Porous Borders and Culture of Arms 
Another problem facing Yemen is its porous border and culture of arms.  Yemen 
has only limited control over who enters and leaves the country, and “according to the 
Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 74,000 
Africans crossed the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on smugglers’ boats and reached the 
shores of Yemen in 2009.”165 Thousands of Somalis, who flee the war in their home 
country for Yemen each year, are now a threat to become the next generation of al-Qaeda 
in Yemen.  Yemen’s ill-defined borders, vast shoreline, and rugged and inaccessible 
mountain region makes Yemen’s ability to combat human and weapons trafficking very 
difficult.  Yemen is also estimated to have “more than three guns for every citizen,” a 
number that has been generated by years of profitable weapons smuggling through 
Yemen’s porous borders.166  
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6. Education 
The Yemeni population is spread throughout an estimated 135,000 villages and 
settlements, with less than one-third of the population living in urban areas.  As a result 
of many of the villages being remote, the Yemeni government has been unable to provide 
the Yemeni people residing in these villages with basic social services.  Due to the lack 
of basic social services being provided by the government, “many settlements are self-
sufficient, providing their own health care centers, schools, and other social services.”167  
There are only about 16,000 schools for the 135,000 villages and settlements and the 
national literacy rate is about 50 percent, while the female illiteracy rate is nearly 70 
percent.  Sixty-five percent of the teachers have only a high school degree.  The lack of 
government-run schools has led to the proliferation of religious schools and it is 
estimated that there may be anywhere from 4,500 to 10,000 religious schools educating 
the Yemeni youth.168  The government has little oversight on what is being taught in the 
religious schools, and in a country trying to prevent the radicalization of its citizens from 
religious extremists, unregulated religious schools should be cause for major concern. 
The economic and demographic challenges facing the Yemeni government are 
daunting enough alone, but at the same time as a persistent insurgency in the north, and 
citizens calling for secession in the south, the challenges threaten the existence of the 
state.  The challenges are weakening the state and AQAP could not ask for a better 
situation in Yemen to attract recruits.  The Yemeni population is young, poorly educated, 
economically depressed, heavily armed, and the government does not have the ability to 
control all regions within its borders.  The Houthi insurgency, secessionists in the south, 
and the failing economy are three major challenges that the Yemeni government currently 
faces that seem to be taking priority over the reemergence of AQAP in Yemen.  The 
Yemeni government sees the challenges as problems that threaten the existence of the 
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government and have, therefore, focused their resources on combating them, which has 
left an opening for AQAP to operate more freely and build the foundation to conduct 
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V. WHY YEMEN? 
The dilemmas facing Yemen explored in the previous chapter are certainly a 
challenge to the government’s ability to counter the threat of AQAP in the country, but 
they alone do not account for the rise of AQAP inside of Yemen.  Yemen’s weak state 
characteristics, along with the failure of jihad in Saudi Arabia, and the lack of Yemeni 
political will to combat the threat of AQAP and their global jihadist agenda in Yemen 
have made the state an ideal location for the regional organization.  The fact that AQAP 
has been successful in gaining a foothold in the ungoverned areas of Yemen is cause for 
concern for the United States and other western countries who face a global terrorist 
threat.  Yemen is not on the verge of becoming a failed state, like Somalia, but the 
challenges the government faces demonstrate that things could get a lot worse before they 
get better unless efforts are made to improve the security and economic conditions.169  If 
economic and security conditions do worsen for Yemen, the state will become an 
excellent location for a reincarnation of the al-Qaeda leadership that is being pushed out 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan today.  The underlying issues that allow AQAP’s message to 
resonate with the people need to be addressed or the terrorism threat in Yemen is likely to 
grow in the future.   
This chapter will address three major reasons why AQAP has come to the 
forefront of al-Qaeda in the Persian Gulf.  At the heart of the problem is the fact that 
Yemen is a weak state and is unable to provide many basic social services to its populace, 
while at the same time, is either unwilling or unable to control the whole extent of its 
territory.  The importance of Yemen in the fight against global terrorism cannot be 
underestimated as “Yemen has contributed fighters to all three generations of the global 
jihad,” and could soon become the next staging point for all major operations against the 
West.170  The United States cannot and should not try to solve this problem alone.  The 
problem of terrorism in Yemen is an international threat that needs to be addressed by the 
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leading powers in the world and, most importantly, by the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries.  By studying the conditions that make Yemen a weak state, we can 
determine how to strengthen the state so that it can provide basic services to the majority 
of its people and eliminate the conditions that allow AQAP to recruit, train, and operate 
within Yemen. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH WEAK STATES 
Today, the United States is the world’s sole remaining superpower, and we no 
longer fear the threat from militaries of other world powers, but “rather transnational 
threats emanating from the world’s most poorly governed countries.”171  Tremendous 
attention has been given to weak and failing states in recent years because of their role in 
transnational terrorism.  Weak and failing states, like Sudan and Afghanistan, have both 
harbored Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda leadership in the last two decades.  From 
these locations, al-Qaeda has been able to conduct terrorist operations that have killed 
thousands of innocent people from the Middle East to Africa to the United States.  Prior 
to 11 September 2001, policymakers viewed failing states strictly through a humanitarian 
lens, but this has changed and the leadership has been convinced that America is now 
more threatened by failing states than it is by conquering ones.172  Lately, weak and 
failing states have caused more worry and “anxiety about the spread of violent Islamic 
extremism and staging of terrorist attacks from ungoverned areas of such states has 
entered U.S. strategic thinking.”173  For the United States to combat the threat of weak 
and failing states such as Yemen, it must first understand the characteristics of weak 
states and why they are unable to provide the proper authority to thwart the threat of 
transnational terrorism.      
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Though attention to weak and failing states has increased, there is no universal 
definition or agreement on the number of these states in the world today.  Failed states 
are commonly defined as those with the inability to achieve the characteristics described 
by Max Weber in his definition of a state.  Failed states cannot “project or assert 
authority within their own borders, making them particularly susceptible to internal 
violence.  They are often characterized by deteriorating living standards, corruption, a 
marked lack of civil society, and fewer services.”174  Terrorist groups are able to flourish 
in states that fall in this category because the state cannot or will not challenge the 
terrorist group.  It can also be argued that weak states can pose just as much danger as 
failed states, as they have many of the same deficiencies.  In most instances of weak and 
failing states, the state just does not have the capabilities to assert effective control over 
the entirety of its territory and this provides an ungoverned space where terrorist 
organizations can recruit, train, and conduct operations successfully.   
There is no consensus on how many weak and failing states there are in the world 
today.  The Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security estimates that there 
are between 50 and 60; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
classifies 46 nations as “fragile,” and the World Bank treats 30 countries in its Low-
Income Under Stress program.175  The discrepancy in estimates shows the differences 
each have in defining weak and failing states, but what can be agreed upon is the fact that 
these states are major cause for concern because they can create a host of problems for 
the rest of the world.  Weak and failing states create pockets that are susceptible to 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, crime, disease, energy insecurity, and regional 
instability.176  Each of these problems is not solely the problem of the individual state, 
but also threatens the security of the rest of the world.  Weak and failing states provide 
bases for transnational criminal enterprises involved in the production, transit, or 
trafficking of drugs, weapons, and guns.  They serve as important breeding grounds for 
new diseases and, because they lack the capacity to respond to the pandemic, endanger 
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the rest of the world.  Weak and failing states endanger energy security because reliance 
on these states increases the risk of interruption of supplies.  These weak states also 
threaten the stability of the entire region as their conflicts can often spill into neighboring 
countries or induce external intervention.177  Although there is a range of problems that 
weak and failing states can cause for the rest of the world, none may be greater to the 
West than the threat of transnational terrorism.   
There may not be a better example of a weak state today than Yemen.  The 
Yemeni government faces a myriad of challenges that consume a tremendous amount of 
their resources, which prevent them from being able to effectively govern the whole of 
their territory.  A nation-state exists to deliver political goods including, security, 
education, health services, economic opportunity, and environmental surveillance to its 
citizens.178  As discussed in Chapter IV, the Yemeni government is unable to provide 
many of the political goods that a state is supposed to provide for its people.  The Yemeni 
economy is failing, unemployment rates are very high, the state is running out of water, 
there are not enough publicly run schools to support the population, malnutrition numbers 
are staggering, and the state is in the middle of fighting two separate conflicts against the 
Houthis in the north and secessionists in the south.  This inability of the Yemeni 
government to govern effectively has produced a sense of illegitimacy that AQAP is 
using to help garner support in the country.  Organizations such as AQAP  
Are eager to step in and fill a void when the government is unable to 
provide its citizens with essential services.  When such groups provide 
health, education, and protection services instead of or better than the 
government, they gain legitimacy, respect, and authority in the eyes of the 
public.179   
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Groups such Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza, have been successful in 
providing these essential services in the past and it has helped lead to their popularity in 
other areas.  AQAP may not be as popular in Yemen as Hizbullah and Hamas are in their 
respective countries, but they are building strong relationships with the powerful Yemeni 
tribes who control large amounts of territory within Yemen.  
Whereas it can be argued that violence is one of the outcomes of an organization 
in response “to an attempt to crush Islamic activism through broad repressive measures 
that leave few alternatives,” this study maintains that Yemen’s inability to provide proper 
goods and services allowed an already violent organization, AQAP, to recruit amongst a 
disgruntled population.180  The Yemeni state is going to continue to weaken as the 
economy worsens and what resources it has continue to go to combating the Houthis and 
southern secessionists.  Its ability to govern the whole of the territory will continue to 
dwindle and AQAP is going to be there in the future, exploiting the weakness by 
operating freely in the ungoverned spaces, and recruiting the disenchanted population.  
The government cannot provide security throughout the country and cannot provide the 
proper social services that should be provided by an effective government.  Yemen can 
be seen as the poster child for problems with weak and failing states.  Although not a 
failed state, Yemen is a weak state, and the al-Qaeda organization has recognized the 
weakness, and will continue to utilize the safe haven provided to them as long as they are 
able to.  Yemen’s weakness will continue to allow AQAP to operate, and if the al-Qaeda 
leadership on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders is forced to flee, Yemen becomes the 
most logical stopping point for the next era of the transnational terrorist network.   
B. SUCCESS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia has mounted a successful campaign against the al-Qaeda 
organization over the last decade.  The study of their success is important to Yemen for 
two major reasons.  First, the success of Saudi Arabia against the al-Qaeda affiliate 
operating within their state pushed Yemen to the forefront for their organization in the 
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region.  Second, the success of the Saudi government serves as an example of how the 
terrorist threat may be countered in Yemen.  Thomas Heghammer argues in his article, 
“The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia,” that despite the widespread view of Saudi Arabia 
as al-Qaeda country, jihad in Saudi Arabia has for the most part failed.181  By studying 
the failure of al-Qaeda or success of Saudi Arabia, we can gather insight to why the 
organization has reappeared in Yemen and what the Yemeni government and other 
western nations can do to exterminate the global threat in Yemen.   
Osama bin Laden announced the Saudi jihad in 1996 after the continued presence 
of U.S. troops deployed to Saudi Arabia during the 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis.  Bin Laden 
considered the presence totally unacceptable and saw the foreign military presence as the 
occupation of a Muslim land.  The United States presence undermined the legitimacy of 
the Saudi state, and caused bin Laden to see the state as an agent of the United States.  
Bin Laden believed that if the Americans were evicted from Saudi Arabia first, the 
regime would certainly fall soon afterward.  He set out to recruit jihadists in Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen to conduct operations in the Kingdom, but suspended operations after a 
severe crackdown by the Saudi state in 1998.  After the United State’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden decided to halt the suspension of operations in the 
Kingdom after the loss of its safe haven in Afghanistan.  During 2002, Saudi al-Qaeda 
members returned home and formed the first resemblance of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) and began a military campaign in Saudi Arabia.182 
From 2003 to 2006, AQAP in Saudi Arabia conducted a series of attacks and 
battled Saudi security forces in an attempt to mount a campaign against Westerners in the 
Kingdom.  The attacks started with the East Riyadh operation in May of 2003 against 
Western expatriates, but soon turned against the Saudi security forces after heavy security 
crackdowns against the organization.  The Saudi crackdown targeted the organization’s 
top leaders and many were either killed or arrested following the first operation.  They 
continued to conduct operations over the next two years against Western targets, but 
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AQAP in Saudi Arabia experienced several setbacks during its campaign, because in 
several of their attacks, the majority of the casualties were Arabs and Muslims.  Before 
these operations, AQAP had mild support amongst the population, but the attacks on their 
own people turned the public opinion against the militants.183  After Saudi security forces 
raided a farm housing the most senior militants of the organization in April 2005, AQAP 
operations slowly died out and, by 2006, the campaign had failed.184 
The failure of the AQAP campaign in Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2006 can be 
explained by three reasons.  The first was the success of security forces; the second was a 
new rehabilitation and counter-radicalization program; and the third was the lack of 
popular support for AQAP.  The security forces in Saudi Arabia were given tremendous 
resources to conduct counterterrorism as “the total security budget in 2004, 2005, and 
2006 was estimated at $8.5, $10 and $12 billion respectively.”185  The Interior Ministry 
built state-of-the-art training centers and the security forces received considerable 
assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States.  The better-trained security 
forces appeared more merciful and forgiving towards militants as they did not torture 
AQAP militants like they did in the mid-1990s.  The state also cracked down on the 
illegal arms market, boosted border control, and offered amnesties in 2004 and 2006 to 
those who surrendered during the campaign.  The Saudi government improved the 
strength of the security forces, while at the same time, appearing to be fair in order to 
stem recruitment and prevent further radicalization of detainees.186 
The second reason for the failure of the jihad in Saudi Arabia was the institution 
of rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs.  The Saudi Arabian government 
viewed the struggle against violent extremism as a “war of ideas,” and “stems from a 
recognition that a violent radical Islamist extremism cannot be defeated by traditional 
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security means alone.”187  They outlined their plan to thwart extremism and 
radicalization through their PRAC strategy, which stands for Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
and Aftercare.  The prevention component of the Saudi strategy targeted not the 
extremists themselves, but the large population who sympathize with extremists and do 
not condemn extremist beliefs.  The government supports a series of summer activities to 
compete with the questionable summer camps and religious retreats that attempt to 
expose young men to extremist ideologies.  The Ministry of Education provides lectures 
and programs throughout the states’ schools to warn young students of the negative 
effects that extremist terrorism and violence cause.  The Saudi state has also instituted a 
large-scale public information campaign to emphasize the damage that terrorism has 
caused to gain public support against extremist beliefs.188 
The second component of the PRAC strategy is rehabilitation, and a focus on “a 
comprehensive effort to rehabilitate and reeducate violent extremists and extremist 
sympathizers through intensive religious debates and psychological counseling.”189  The 
objective of the rehab program is to get the terrorists to renounce their ideologies through 
intense religious debate with very credible religious figures.  It is based on the fact that 
the suspects were misled by extremists about their faith and that through a proper 
understanding of their religion, the suspects would abandon their extremist beliefs.  The 
final component of the PRAC strategy is aftercare.  The aftercare programs provide a 
halfway house for detainees to ease their way back into society, programs to reintegrate 
former Guantanamo Bay detainees, and policies to prevent released detainees from 
committing new crimes.  Once an individual has renounced his beliefs, served his time in 
a care rehabilitation center, and is released, assistance is provided by the state in locating 
a job and other benefits such as government stipends, a car, and an apartment.  They are 
also encouraged to settle down, marry, and start a family.  The PRAC program has shown 
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good results, claiming a success rate of 80 to 90 percent.  Out of the roughly fourteen 
hundred individuals who have been released, the Saudi state claims only thirty-five have 
been rearrested for security offenses.190  The rehabilitation and counter-radicalization 
programs have been very successful in spoiling the success of extremism in Saudi Arabia 
since the start of al-Qaeda’s most recent campaign in 2003.   
A third reason for the failure of jihad in Saudi Arabia was the lack of support of 
the populace for the extremists.  The Saudi government did an excellent job of using the 
media to “magnify the effect of violence on Muslim life and property, thereby 
undermining the militants’ message that their jihad focused on Westerners.”191  With 
each attack by the AQAP in Saudi Arabia that killed innocent Muslims, the populace 
turned more and more against the extremists.  The Saudi state used its media to capitalize 
on the attacks by portraying the militants as terrorists, not those who were participating in 
a lawful jihad.  AQAP in Saudi Arabia were also unable to obtain any scholarly 
credibility, which is very serious in the Kingdom, because their mainstream credible 
figures were imprisoned early in the campaign and the ideologues who took their place 
had much less respect and influence in the Islamist community.  Because the Iraq war 
was ongoing during this time, many Saudis also felt that if extremists really wanted to 
combat the Crusaders, they should move their fight to Iraq.192  The violence of the 
organization on the Saudi population and the ability of the Saudi state to control the 
media to emphasize the terrorist tendencies of the early AQAP, severely hindered its 
ability to recruit and maintain sympathizers and generally created little support among the 
Saudi population.    
The importance of the failure of the former AQAP in Saudi Arabia is important to 
understanding the rise of AQAP in Yemen.  The failure of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia is 
one of the main reasons why Yemen moved to the forefront for the regional organization. 
The strength of the Saudi security forces and the ability of the government to isolate the 
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organization limited Saudi Arabia as a location to operate from.  What Yemen offered to 
the al-Qaeda leadership was the exact opposite.  Yemen’s weak state characteristics, 
sympathetic population, and lack of political will to eliminate its threat, served as a 
perfect site to reorganize the group.  Although there is little continuity between any of the 
personnel between the Yemeni AQAP of 2009 and its Saudi predecessor, the 
organization was able to make a rebirth in Yemen under more ideal conditions.193  It 
seems that the Yemeni AQAP has learned from some of the mistakes the Saudi AQAP 
made, and has stayed away from attacking the local population and has worked hard to 
garner support among the tribes.  The support of the tribes in many areas of Yemen offers 
AQAP the areas to recruit and operate, something they were never fully able to 
accomplish in Saudi Arabia.  The Yemeni AQAP has many of the same goals as its 
former Saudi organization, but now has better conditions to act on them.  They have still 
attempted to attack Saudi Arabia, as the attack on Deputy Interior Minster Prince 
Mohammed bin Nayef showcased, but they have focused their rage against Western 
entities.194  The reemergence of AQAP in Yemen shows that the fight against the 
Western Crusaders and apostate regimes has continued, but if the Yemeni regime, with 
the support of the GCC and western countries, is successful in eliminating the threat of 
AQAP in Yemen, al-Qaeda may have very few options on where to take the organization 
next.  
A second major learning point from the failure of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia is that 





                                                 
193 Heghammer, “The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia,” 26. 
194 Scott Stewart, “AQAP: Paradigm Shifts and Lessons Learned,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 




To eradicate support for extremism is not one to be waged solely as a 
security contest but as one that will require a concerted effort by the entire 
state apparatus, from schools and mosques, to local and provincial 
administrations, and the mass media, and social service providers and 
organizations.195 
The conditions in Yemen may not be identical to those in Saudi Arabia, but the 
example of success can be used to build toward creating stronger institutions in Yemen to 
combat the recruiting ability and sympathy of AQAP by the local populace.  Saudi 
Arabia provides a great model of what Yemen’s counterterrorism program should strive 
to become if the government really wants to eradicate the extremist organization from its 
country.  It also offers Western countries a model as to what support needs to be given to 
Yemen if they want to help Yemen with its fight to prevent AQAP from having the areas 
and support to conduct operations against Western interests.  The GCC should also be 
heavily involved in helping Yemen build a stronger counterterrorism program because it 
is in the GCCs interest to do so.  Further weakening in Yemen can leak to other areas of 
the Gulf and cause instability in the region that could affect every member of the GCC.  
Yemen’s problems should not be seen as just its own.  The success of the Saudi state, in 
combating the threat of al-Qaeda, forced the regional al-Qaeda organization to relocate to 
Yemen, but at the same time, it offered the rest of the world a great illustration on how 
the threat of extremist organizations can be impeded in the Middle East.   
C. LACK OF POLITICAL WILL 
The lack of political will by the Yemeni government has been another major 
reason why AQAP has been able to prosper in Yemen in recent years.  Though they lack 
the ability to combat the threat of AQAP in many areas, they also seem to lack the 
political will to combat the organization.  The effort they make to combat the threat of 
AQAP in the country seems to be just enough to appease the United States in order to 
prevent Yemen from becoming the next location for the global war on terror.  Yemen 
does not see the AQAP as a threat to the state’s existence as it does the Houthi Rebellion 
and southern secessionists and, therefore, is not as committed to eliminating the terrorist 
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organization.  The Yemeni government also has a history of accommodating global 
jihadists in the country as well as releasing former jihadists on the condition that they 
“pledged to respect the rights of non-Muslim foreigners living in Yemen or visiting 
it.”196  The Yemeni government may be seen as making an effort to combat the danger of 
AQAP in Yemen, but a change in mindset of the threat of AQAP is going to need to be 
made by the Yemeni government if the AQAP is going to be impeded in the country. 
Though AQAP claims they would like to overthrow the illegitimate government 
under President Saleh, they have done little in the form of attacks against the state.  The 
majority of the major attacks conducted by AQAP in Yemen have been against Western 
targets, not the national government, though clashes between the two have led to Yemeni 
troops being killed and injured.197  As long as AQAP is going to focus its attacks on 
Western targets, the Yemeni government is going to continue to keep the Houthi 
Rebellion and the southern secessionists at a higher priority.  Currently, the only threat 
AQAP exhibits to the Yemeni government would be if it caused a foreign intervention in 
Yemen due to its actions, an event that seems very unlikely in the near future.   
The Yemeni government may even see the threat of AQAP on Western countries 
as being to its advantage.  As long as there is a threat, it is going to continue to receive 
money from Western donors and the Yemeni government is taking advantage of the 
situation.  Most recently, the United States pledged $150 million in security assistance for 
Yemen, up from $67 million the year before.198  When al-Qaeda was eliminated in 
Yemen in 2003, the United States turned its focus away from security in the country and 
eventually removed all foreign aid because the Yemeni government did not meet the 
democratic prerequisites set before them.  The Yemeni government is benefiting from the 
threat of AQAP in its country and is doing just enough to appear as an ally to the United 
States in the fight against the global jihadist threat.  The Yemeni government may be 
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assuming that if it wants to continue to receive money from the international community, 
there must be an international threat, and therefore is going to prolong the fight against 
AQAP as long as it is beneficial.   
The Yemeni government may also lack the political will to combat the threat of 
AQAP in the country because it is in a precarious position in its relationship with the 
United States.  It cannot appear to be too close to the United States, for fear it will be 
charged with being collaborators to the enemy.  President Saleh “paid a high price 
domestically for allowing the United States to carry out an attack in Yemen,” when they 
allowed the November 2002 strike on al-Qaeda’s head in Yemen, al-Harithri.199  This 
may be the reason it has refused to go after radical U.S.-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki 
after he was added to the CIA’s list of targets to be killed or captured.200  The Yemeni 
government has to walk a fine line between cooperating with the United States and not 
appearing too close to the United States, as its own citizens are weary of any intentions 
the United States has in their country.  If the Yemeni government was seen as a full-
fledged partner with the United States, AQAP could use that to help its message resonate 
with the population.  The Yemeni government must also be careful to not harm innocent 
civilians during its attacks to combat AQAP because any civilian death supports AQAP’s 
claims that the government is not treating the Yemeni people appropriately.  The Yemeni 
government may, therefore, be conducting just enough attacks to appease the United 
States and this allows AQAP to continue to conduct operations against Western entities 
inside and outside the country. 
Yemen’s lack of political will to eliminate the threat of AQAP in the country can 
also been seen in its attempted rehabilitation program and its decisions to negotiate with 
suspected terrorists.  In September 2002, the Yemeni government established the 
Committee for Religious Dialogue to “interact with security detainees on suspicion of 
involvement with Islamist extremists and terrorists.”201  The program sought to create 
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religious discussions and debates about terrorism based on religion, get the participants to 
recognize the authority of the state, and obtain assurances that they would not participate 
in violence within the country.  There were clearly many flaws in the program and it was 
eventually suspended.  The program plainly stated that those who renounced violence 
would be eligible for release through an amnesty program, which basically created a 
revolving door policy.  The Yemeni government also provided little external social 
support, support that has been very successful in Saudi Arabia.  Passports were not 
confiscated and the Yemeni government did not maintain close tabs on the former 
prisoners.  The breakdown of the program may be seen in its failure to provide external 
support and because the committee was less concerned with actually changing the 
ideological beliefs of the participants than it was with obtaining their acquiescence on 
sensitive political matters.  Many of the 364 released have reportedly been killed in 
Iraq.202   
The rehabilitation program indicates that the Yemeni government is willing to go 
through the motions, but is unwilling to put any substance behind its policies.  It seems it 
is willing to negotiate with the terrorists and in exchange for the “promise” not to conduct 
further attacks, prisoners will be released.  One such example of this is the case of Jamal 
al-Badawi, one of the masterminds of the USS Cole attack.  Within weeks of his capture 
in 2007, it was reported that he was granted freedom in exchange for his assurance that 
he would not commit violent activities within the borders of the state.203  The Yemeni 
government only cares whether the terrorist agrees not to commit violence within the 
state, and what he does outside the borders of Yemen seems to be of no relevance.  The 
actions by the Yemeni government in their treatment of global jihadists makes it a very 
suspect security partner and shows that they may lack the political will to combat the 
threat of terrorists inside their country, unless the government truly feels threatened that 
the organization could topple the regime.   
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The lack of political will to combat the terrorist threat exhibited by AQAP in 
Yemen may have much to do with the treatment of Islamic fighters after the Soviet War 
in Afghanistan.   
Several thousand ‘Arab Afghan’ volunteers, who fought alongside the 
mujahidin (Islamic fighters), returned to Yemen and were subsequently 
embraced by the government and treated as heroes by many Yemenis.  
Some veterans of the Afghan war were integrated into the military and 
security forces.204   
Former Afghan volunteers were also incorporated into the Yemeni government 
and many who occupy positions in the regime are “sympathetic to anti-US militants and 
Yemeni fighters abroad.”205  These leaders oppose cooperation with the United States on 
the war against terror and showed that they do not oppose Yemenis fighting against the 
United States when a court acquitted a number of defendants who admitted to fighting in 
Iraq because they declared it was legal under Yemeni law.206  Men like Abd al-Majid al-
Zindani, who was a former associate of Osama bin Laden, hold important places in 
Yemeni society.  He helped found one of the major political parties in Yemen, the Islah 
party, and is in charge of al-Iman University, whose students have been connected to a 
number of violent activities.  The United States has accused al-Zindani of using the 
university as a recruiting ground for al-Qaeda and the Yemeni government has refused to 
turn him over to U.S. authorities.  People sympathetic to the cause of AQAP are 
imbedded in the Yemeni government and are partially responsible for the reasons the 
Yemeni government has not fully gone after eliminating AQAP in Yemen.   
AQAP has been able to grow inside Yemen to the point of being able to conduct 
international attacks against the United States, as the failed Christmas Day bombing 
illustrates.  Yemen’s weak state characteristics, along with the failure of jihad in Saudi 
Arabia and the lack of Yemeni political will to combat the threat of AQAP and their 
global jihadist agenda in Yemen, have made the state an ideal location for the regional 
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organization.  These three reasons, along with the challenges that the Yemeni government 
faces, have brought Yemen to the forefront of the al-Qaeda organization.  To combat the 
threat of AQAP in Yemen, and their ability to conduct operations against Western targets 
inside Yemen, as well as internationally, these topics need to be addressed.  The previous 
chapters have explained the history of al-Qaeda inside Yemen, the rise of the AQAP, and 
the reasons AQAP has been able to flourish in the country over the last several years.  
After studying how AQAP has been able to thrive, we can now look to counter those 
elements that allow the organization to thrive.  By eliminating the factors that allow 
AQAP to recruit, train, and resonate with the population, the Yemeni government, along 
with its international partners, may be able to counter AQAP and remove Yemen as an 
ideal location for the global jihadist organization.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has tried to develop a thorough explanation for the recent rise of the al-
Qaeda affiliate, AQAP, in Yemen.  The study has focused on the fact that Yemen is a 
weak state in dire straits and its failure to provide proper social services to its entire 
population and its inability to control the whole of its territory has allowed AQAP to 
rebuild an organization that was nearly decimated by the end of 2003.  The challenges 
facing Yemen are not unique to the region as many countries in the Middle East are 
facing similar economic, demographic, and security challenges.  There are also dozens of 
weak states throughout the world, “however, in Yemen these challenges threaten to 
disrupt not just local stability, but also regional and international stability…If left 
unaddressed, Yemen’s problems could potentially destabilize Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf States.”207  Yemen’s history of supporting global jihadists during the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan, AQAP’s ability to generate a message that resonates with a portion of the 
Yemeni population, and Yemen’s weak state characteristics should be cause for action by 
Western countries who are attempting to combat the threat of global terrorism.  Recent 
reports have warned that dozens of “veterans of al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan 
have been pouring into Yemen,” and unless a substantial effort is made to combat the 
threat of al-Qaeda, Yemen may become the next headquarters for the organization.208  
Western countries should be placing Yemen near the front of their priorities for the war 
against global extremists, behind only Afghanistan and Pakistan.  If the threat of AQAP 
in Yemen is not met, it may lead to disastrous security repercussions for countries in the 
Gulf as well as the United States.   
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Since the attempted Christmas Day bombing, the United States has promised to 
increase total aid to Yemen by significant amounts.  The United States plans to increase 
development and security assistance aid to Yemen $10 million to $63 million in 2010.209  
This does not include $150 million in military assistance to Yemen approved by Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates on 19 February of this year.  This amount doubled the previous 
year’s military assistance to the country.210  The Pentagon has also assigned “more 
special forces personnel to Yemen as part of a broad push to speed the training of the 
country’s counterterror forces in the wake of the failed Christmas Day attack.”211  The 
aid proposed to Yemen in the coming year is a start to helping Yemen combat the threat 
of AQAP in Yemen, but it is not nearly the complete solution.  The United States cannot 
help strengthen Yemen by itself, and the United States, along with the international 
community, must strike at the underlying issues that have allowed AQAP to reemerge in 
Yemen once again. 
In late January 2010, the United Kingdom held a conference in London to discuss 
the threat posed by Yemen and the al-Qaeda affiliate that operates from the country.  
More than two dozen governments and international financial institutions, including 
foreign ministers from Yemen’s Persian Gulf neighbors, as well as the U.S., Russia, 
China and leading NATO members, met and discussed what needs to be done to combat 
the transnational terrorist threat in Yemen.  During the conference, Yemen asked the 
international community to provide $4 billion annually.212  Currently, Yemen receives on 
average of $13 to $15 per capita in total foreign aid money, less than what many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa receive.  Yemen officials believe that their country 
receives inadequate international aid attention considering their strategic importance and 
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the risks of regional stability and security with the problems facing their country.  The 
United Kingdom is the single largest foreign donor in Yemen as it has committed $83 
million per year for the next five years. 213   
In 2006, the GCC pledged $3.7 billion dollars to Yemen, though only 15 percent 
of its commitments were honored.214  At the London conference, the GCC pledged to 
make good on the pledge from four years ago.  The biggest total donor out of the GCC is 
Saudi Arabia as they provide investments, grants, and nearly annual direct budgetary 
support.215  It is important that the promises made at conferences like the one held in 
London are followed through.  The United Kingdom is leading the donor community 
with the support of the United States, but these two countries cannot prop up Yemen by 
themselves.  The GCC must and should play a huge rule in supporting the Yemeni 
government in its efforts to strengthen.  It is in its own best interest to do so because an 
unstable Yemen can have effects in every country throughout the Middle East.  Saudi 
Arabia should especially be concerned about an unstable Yemen.  The two countries 
share a long porous border and AQAP in Yemen today is a reincarnation of the AQAP 
found in Saudi Arabia just a few years ago.  The money given to Yemen needs to be 
invested in the local communities to help support the government’s ability to provide 
basic social services to its people.  The following recommendations suggest what the 
United States can do to help strengthen Yemen, but this effort cannot and should not be 
done by the United States alone.  The terrorist threat in Yemen is an international one, 
and to help combat it, the help of the international community is crucial.   
For the United States, the most important step to combating the international 
threat of AQAP coming from Yemen is stabilizing the country.  The United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the GCC countries must guarantee that they will not allow Yemen 
to weaken further and have the chance of becoming a failed state.  This effort will force 
the United States to put even more money into the country, but the United States cannot 
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link all of its aid to the terrorist threat.  If international donors, including the United 
States, continue to only focus on the threat of AQAP in Yemen, at the expense of the 
other major issues in the country, it only causes the Yemeni government to prolong the 
conflict to continue to receive financial assistance.  Yemen must not feel that they would 
be forgotten or neglected in the absence of the global jihadist threat emanating from their 
country.216  The United States has shown this type of shortsightedness before in Yemen, 
after the near collapse of al-Qaeda in the country in 2003, and because the United States 
neglected Yemen, AQAP was able to reemerge stronger than before and with more 
recruits.  The U.S. focus in Yemen should consist of four major factors: continued 
targeting of AQAP leaders, creating stability in Yemen by helping end the two major 
internal conflicts in the country, address the underlying grievances of the population’s 
lack of social services, and help institute a well-founded soft counterterrorism program 
based on the successful Saudi program.  If the United States is able to help Yemen meet 
these four criteria, the ability of AQAP to recruit, train, and operate in the country, as 
well as the prospect of Yemen becoming the next headquarters for the al-Qaeda 
leadership, will be severely hindered.   
A. TARGET AQAP 
The United States must continue to assist Yemen in the targeting of AQAP 
leaders.  AQAP will have tremendous difficulty in replacing experienced and competent 
operational leaders and the loss of major components of their leadership will strikingly 
blunt their effectiveness.  The United States and Yemen were successful at this in 2002–
2003, when they effectively eliminated al-Qaeda in Yemen by targeting the al-Harithri 
network.  Their assistance should consist of sharing intelligence and preparing Yemeni 
forces to conduct strikes, but it is important for the United States to work through the 
Yemeni security forces and not appear as the guiding force behind the attacks.  The 
United States needs to be a silent unseen partner in this endeavor as any “overt Western 
involvement in targeting AQAP’s leadership risks fueling the anti-Western sentiment 
amongst the tribes that would be far more likely to strengthen, rather than weaken, their 
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support for AQAP.”217  The U.S.-assisted air strikes conducted in mid-December were 
seen by many Yemenis as an encroachment on their sovereignty.  Any further overt 
Western intervention only helps AQAP’s message that the Yemeni government is an 
American lackey and undeserving to govern Yemen.218 
Currently, U.S. special operation forces are training Yemeni security forces in 
order to build Yemen’s capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations and continued 
training should take place to improve the Yemeni forces’ ability to combat AQAP.  By 
helping Yemeni security forces build their capability, the United States can eventually 
distance itself from operations and prevent a backlash from its involvement.  To help 
combat the threat of AQAP, it is vital that Yemen, with the assistance of the United 
States, attempts to eliminate the leadership of AQAP, and once eliminated, work in other 
areas of counterterrorism to prevent it from rising again. 
B. END CONFLICTS TO INCREASE STABILITY 
Yemen has spent a tremendous amount of their limited resources in fighting the 
Houthi Rebellion and southern secessionists.  Not only have the two campaigns been 
costly, the Houthi Rebellion has also led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
Yemenis.  The United States must put pressure on the Yemeni government to end the two 
conflicts so that its focus can be turned to combating AQAP and improving its economy 
and social services.  AQAP has been able to prosper on the instability of the Yemeni 
government, and the government’s inability to combat this threat, because its attention 
was focused elsewhere.  Stabilizing the two major internal conflicts in Yemen is a 
necessary condition for the Yemeni government before it is going to be willing to put a 
major portion of its resources towards thwarting the threat of AQAP.  Until the two 
conflicts that the Yemeni government sees as threatening the existence of its regime are 
eliminated, it is going to continue to maintain only a token fight against the transnational 
terrorist threat emanating from its country. 
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The United States needs to persuade Middle Eastern countries like Qatar to act as 
a mediator between the Yemeni government and its two disgruntled entities.  The Qatari 
government was nearly successful in the cease-fire agreements in 2007 and 2008 between 
the Yemeni government and the leaders of the Houthi rebellion.  At the core of the 
agreement was Qatar’s “pledge to finance reconstruction and launch major development 
projects in Saada, possibly to the tune of $300 million to $500 million.”219  Now is a 
perfect time for a lasting agreement to be established between the Yemeni government 
and the Houthis because they are currently in a cease-fire.  A Qatari led conference 
should focus on integrating the Zaydis of the north into the Yemeni political system.  
Zaydis see themselves as being excluded by the Wahhabi entities in Yemen, and the state 
should respond with accommodation and inclusion.  One key to peace could be creating a 
Houthi political party that could represent the Zaydi population and integrate it into the 
state structure.220  Many of the Houthi grievances stem from the fact that they feel 
excluded, that there is regional underdevelopment, and perceived socioeconomic 
injustices.  By integrating them into the state structure, the government can work to 
alleviate the grievances and create a community that does not feel threatened by the rest 
of the population.  The United States should not play the role of mediator in the Houthi 
situation, but should urge the Yemeni government to produce a solution that can help 
meet the grievances of the Zaydi population.  The Zaydi population has a storied history 
in Yemen, and dominated both the religious and political life of North Yemen for nearly 
a thousand years.  Their inclusion into the government could help build a more united 
Yemen and stabilize the country so the government can focus on the global jihadist threat 
that is thriving there. 
The United States must also help the Yemeni government end the southern 
secessionist movement.  Once again, the movement is based on the fact that a percentage 
of the population feels the government neglects them both economically and politically.  
The solution to the southern secessionist movement should be political not military, and 
the United States must not support Saleh in an expanded military campaign against the 
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south.  Saleh should be pushed to address the movement’s political grievances, negotiate 
with moderate southern leaders, address the problem of economic development, and 
rebuild national reconciliation.221  The Qatari government, or another friendly Middle 
Eastern regime, should be brought in to mediate the reconciliation.  The reconciliation 
should be politically inclusive and bring back the former southern business community 
and ruling class to help turn the southern economy around.  The Yemeni government 
needs to do the same thing with the Southern Movement as the Houthi Rebellion, and that 
is to include them politically so they can have a voice in how their region of Yemen is 
governed. Both conflicts stem from each community feeling neglected because they 
believe they do not receive the same economic and political possibilities of the northern 
elite.  By bringing the two agitated populations into the political arena, many of the 
grievances held by the factions may be solved, and the state can put more money into 
developing the economy and combating the threat of AQAP.  
C. HELP ADDRESS YEMENI GRIEVANCES 
This thesis has studied the many grievances the Yemeni population has with its 
government due to its lack of ability to provide the population with the social services 
provided by most governments around the world.  The majority of the grievances stem 
from the state’s weakness and AQAP is able to exploit the weakness and successfully 
recruit, train, and conduct operations inside of Yemen.  In order to help Yemen combat 
AQAP inside Yemen, the United States must target the Yemeni grievances by 
strengthening Yemen’s state capacity to effectively govern its people.  The United States 
must invest in the “legitimacy and capacity of the state and society.  We cannot grant 
‘legitimacy,’ but we can assist in the development of those elements of the state that 
provide services to the citizens, and the development of a society strong enough to be 
partners to its state.”222  Military strikes, alone, against al-Qaeda are not the answer.  By 
strengthening Yemen and eliminating the grievances that push a percentage of the 
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population towards AQAP, the United States can help combat the threat of al-Qaeda in 
two ways: targeting the organization and eliminating the factors that allow them to 
successfully operate.   
The first focus for helping strengthen the Yemeni state should be strengthening 
the Yemeni economy.  The unemployment rate is conservatively estimated at 35 percent, 
and this serves as a huge recruiting tool for AQAP.  The United States and the GCC must 
work with Yemen to develop a post-oil economy in areas that can present jobs to the 
local population.  One idea could be a revitalization of the Aden Port.  It was vital to the 
British Empire, and today, could be another Singapore.  Investing money and developing 
the port could “provide employment and government revenue, and help integrate the 
south and the north as more equal partners.”223  It is a major natural resource for the 
Yemeni government and should be taken advantage of.  If the security situation is 
secured, Yemen could benefit from its rich cultural heritage through tourism as well.  The 
introduction of agricultural diversification could help to wean the country off qat 
production and help produce enough food to feed the large portions of the country going 
hungry each day.  GCC countries must also re-open their doors to Yemeni labor, as was 
the situation before the first Gulf War.  The Yemeni economy has never recovered from 
the expulsion of nearly a million Yemenis from the Gulf and the correlating remittances 
lost.  The Yemeni economy has the ability to rebound, but it is going to need the help of 
the United States and the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia.  Putting average Yemenis back 
to work would help eliminate one of the key recruiting tools used by AQAP to exploit the 
weak Yemeni government.  As the United States and Yemen become more successful at 
fighting the threat of AQAP inside of Yemen, it will create safe conditions for foreign 
direct investment, so the strengthening of the government and its ability to thwart AQAP 
will go hand in hand.  Security is needed in Yemen to help the economy and a better 
economy will help the security situation.   
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To help the Yemeni government gain legitimacy with its people, Washington is 
going to have to put even more money into Yemen than projected for 2010.  The aid 
programs of the United States should work toward “bypassing the central government in 
favor of regional and local levels.”224  The government’s ability to get the necessary aid 
to the Yemenis who need it is lacking, and developing a system to deliver foreign aid to a 
local implementing partner will benefit Yemen.  The money must be dedicated to help 
provide the basic social services that a population expects.  The education system in 
Yemen should be a major focus of the increased aid.  Education is critical to the long-
term development of the economy and the survival of the state.  The Yemeni population 
needs more state-regulated schools, but more importantly, qualified teachers at the 
primary and secondary levels.  A better education system will also help the economy as 
the population will gain the necessary skills to help induce foreign investment.  The 
United States must help create programs to aid the education system in Yemen so that the 
radical Islamist teaching is kept away from the majority of the youth.  By building a 
superior education system, the Yemeni government can mitigate the influence of AQAP 
and its ability to recruit the uneducated, disenfranchised youth.   
Along with education, money from international donors must be put into the local 
level to provide health care, and the water crisis must also be addressed.  Aid could be 
used to develop expensive desalinization projects, improve irrigation, and be put towards 
implementing a plan to regulate and govern appropriate and legal water usage. The 
United States must encourage help from the GCC in order to implement better Yemeni 
governance of social services for its people.  If the population begins to receive the social 
services that they feel are owed to them, the grievances that AQAP exploits will continue 
to erode.  Everything possible in Yemen must be done to prevent the population from 
depending on AQAP for basic necessities that the government cannot provide.  As is the 
case with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, it will only lead to more support for 
AQAP and less legitimacy for the Yemeni government.   
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The final aspect of strengthening the government to help combat the violence of 
AQAP is improving the flaws of the governance.  Yemen has “20 years experience in 
reasonably free, fair, and contested elections, including the last presidential election, 
nationally based multiparties, universal suffrage, and a strong civil society, its democratic 
experience is fragile and flawed but real and, most importantly, indigenous.”225  Yemen 
has a legitimate democratic structure, but much of the population does not see the 
government as legitimate because of rampant corruption.  The United States is not going 
to be able to solve all of Yemen’s problems, but it can work with Yemen to create 
agencies to combat corruption inside the government.  By getting aid to the local 
governments, the United States can bypass levels of the central government that will take 
time in halting the corruption.  The flaws of the Yemeni government should be a focus of 
the assistance, not a reason to disengage or not engage the Yemeni state.  Yemen has a 
robust civil society estimated at 7,000 local NGOs and a number of international NGOs 
headed by Yemenis, and at the local level, these organizations can help implement the aid 
provided by donors. 
AQAP’s strength in gaining a foothold in Yemeni society has been in its ability to 
build strong relationships with the Yemeni tribes, who have a strong presence in many 
parts of Yemen.  Unlike in Iraq, where al-Qaeda intimidated the tribes, in Yemen AQAP 
has been able to foster a relationship with the tribes by focusing on the grievances that the 
tribes have with the government.  They have also married into the tribes and are 
becoming part of the tribal community.  In Yemen, AQAP’s attacks have focused on 
Western entities and it has not isolated the tribes or turned the population against it 
through the killing of innocent Muslims, like they did in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  AQAP 
has learned from the mistakes made by al-Qaeda organizations elsewhere, and have been 
careful to maintain strong ties to the tribal elements in Yemen.  The strength of the tribal 
alliance could also be the biggest weakness of AQAP if the Yemeni government was able 
to isolate the tribes from AQAP.  Currently, it is the tribes that are providing security in 
their areas for AQAP elements to recruit, train, and operate.  Undermining the 
relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi tribes was vital to the undermining of 
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the network in the country.  By eliminating the grievances many of the tribes have with 
the government, including lack of social services and very little say in the political 
process, the Yemeni government can isolate AQAP.  The loyalty between AQAP and the 
Yemeni tribes is thin, and if the Yemeni government was willing to make a better offer to 
the tribes than they are getting from AQAP, it is more than likely that the alliance 
between the tribal elements in Yemen and AQAP could fracture.   
By slowing cronyism and bringing more Yemenis into the political environment, 
the Yemeni government can turn around many of the feelings of disenfranchisement by a 
majority of the population.  It is important that the Yemeni government is urged to bring 
leaders of the Houthi Rebellion and Southern Movement into the government so they can 
have a say in the governing of their territories.  These conflicts threaten to tear the 
Yemeni state apart, and much of the grievances have to do with the fact they feel 
neglected by the government.  By giving them a say and ironing out differences, unity 
can be saved and the Yemeni government can turn its focus to other major issues that 
threaten the stability of the region, like the global jihadist agenda of AQAP.  The Yemeni 
government is not going to turn into a strong and stable government over night, but if the 
United States and regional and international powers are willing to work with Yemen for 
the long term, Yemen has the potential and can turn its situation around.  The United 
States cannot force its agenda on the Yemeni government, but must support the 
institutions, structures, and processes that most Yemenis take pride in.226  Yemen can be 
strengthened, but it is going to take the help of the important Western donor countries, 
and most importantly, its neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
D. SOFT COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
The fourth major factor of U.S. focus in Yemen should be the institution of a soft 
counterterrorism strategy based on Saudi Arabia’s successful program.  The Saudi 
program was successful because they understood that violent Islamist extremism cannot 
be defeated by traditional security means alone.  The Saudis knew they needed to defeat 
the ideological infrastructure that supports political violence and were willing to invest 
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the resources necessary.227  The United States needs to encourage Saudi Arabia to 
financially and structurally help Yemen create a successful soft counterterrorism 
campaign based on the PRAC strategy, because it is in Saudi Arabia’s best interest to do 
so.  The previous Yemeni rehabilitation campaign lacked the necessary prevention and 
aftercare for the program to be successful.  Yemen’s history of supporting global 
jihadism is working against it, but Yemen must work to reeducate the public about the 
dangers of extremism and radical Islam, and the negative effect it is having on the 
country.  It must be made clear that the security situation is preventing foreign investment 
from entering the country, which is hurting the economy.  The resources necessary for a 
proper aftercare program are vast, but necessary, if the program is going to be effective.  
If the government is able to portray, like Saudi Arabia was, that they are trying to help 
those who have been “tricked” by radical Islamists, the population may start trusting the 
government a little more.  The Yemeni security services need to eliminate torturing 
suspects, something that has only worked to turn more moderates radical, and focus on 
rehabilitating Yemenis who may be supporting extremism.  The failure of jihad in Saudi 
Arabia can be attributed to successful targeting of terrorists and the soft counterterrorism 
campaign.  If Yemen is able to institute a program under the guidance of Saudi Arabia, 
which is able to defeat the extremist ideologies of AQAP, while at the same time 
continue to target the AQAP leadership, the Yemeni government could eliminate the 
network in its country. 
The threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a substantial danger 
that not only Yemen should be concerned about.  The United States is one of the main 
targets of the al-Qaeda affiliate, and with the attempted Christmas Day bombing, AQAP 
has shown they are capable of conducting operations outside of the Arabian Peninsula.  
This study has tried to show the context in which AQAP has been able to prosper by 
studying the chaotic history of Yemen in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the 
history of Yemen as an implicit supporter of jihad inside the country as well as abroad.    
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AQAP has been able to make a reemergence in Yemen because of Yemen’s weak 
state characteristics, the failure of jihad in Saudi Arabia, and the apparent lack of political 
will to destroy the organization.  AQAP has been able to exploit the weakness of the state 
to build a foundation for its organization, and is now capable of conducting operations 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the Western world.  To combat the threat of AQAP 
in Yemen and prevent the country from becoming the next headquarters of the al-Qaeda 
leadership, the Yemeni state is going to need tremendous help from the West, the 
countries in its region, and the political will to fight AQAP will need to be increased.  
The GCC countries should see a stable Yemen as in their best interest, for if Yemen is 
allowed to fall into a failed state, the repercussions will most immediately be felt 
throughout the Gulf.   
Yemen is a weak state and is in turmoil, but it is not a lost cause, and the United 
States should work with Yemen, the United Kingdom, and the GCC to strengthen Yemen 
so that it can combat the threat of global terrorism inside the country.  Yemen is one of 
the most important countries in the global war on terrorism, behind only Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and the United States should makes its aid packages to the country proportional 
to its strategic importance.228  Yemen should certainly be considered the main region the 
al-Qaeda leadership would move to should they be forced to flee the borders of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.  Yemen has emerged as a major threat to the United States and other 
Western countries, and to counter the threat, the United States must help strengthen the 
Yemeni state.  By studying the organization’s history and the reasons it has been able to 
become a global threat to security once again, this study has tried to determine how to 
defeat the organization and prevent Yemen from becoming the United States’ next 
Afghanistan.   
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